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Supply Incentives 
Thomas Aronsson and James R. Walker 
Sweden’s extensive social insurance programs that  care for Swedes “from 
cradle to grave” necessitate a tax burden that is among the highest in the world. 
This paper contributes to the discussion by summarizing the incentive effects 
of the principal tax and transfer programs that affect the Swedish labor supply. 
We  adopt a broad definition of  labor supply to cover a wide array of potential 
incentive effects. First, we describe the institutional details of  how Sweden’s 
cash transfer programs and tax system affect incentives and for whom. Second, 
we review the voluminous labor supply literature and recent empirical evi- 
dence obtained from Swedish data to measure the most important behavioral 
effects and to assess probable consequences of legislative reforms. 
5.1  Dimensions of Labor Supply 
It is common to think of labor supply as a homogeneous quantity, such as the 
number of hours worked or the number of people employed. Yet one important 
insight to be gleaned from the labor supply research conducted over the last 
three decades has been the recognition of the many distinct dimensions of la- 
bor supply. We  consider three dimensions: (1) participation (whether an indi- 
vidual works); (2)  the number of hours supplied in a period; and (3) quality or 
skill of  the worker (also called human cupirul, where the worker’s skill is to 
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some extent a choice variable). We  also make the distinction between short- 
and long-run measures of labor supply. 
5.2  Theory of Labor Supply Response 
We begin with a description of the individual’s choice of hours of work in a 
static framework, which will be referred to as the canonical model. Its simple 
structure is useful for discussing the basic effects of  taxes and transfer pro- 
grams on labor force participation and hours of work. 
5.2.1  The Canonical Model 
We  represent the individual’s preferences over consumption goods and lei- 
sure by the utility function u = u(c, L),  where c is a composite consumption 
good, L = T -  h is leisure, T is total time available (i.e., the time endowment), 
and h is hours of  work. The utility function is assumed to be increasing and 
strictly quasi concave in its arguments. The budget constraint is written 
(1)  wh  +  - r + B = c, 
where w is the hourly gross wage rate, y is nonlabor income, r is the total tax 
payment, and B is a transfer payment received by the individual. To illustrate 
the outcome of  utility maximization subject to equation (l), let us start by 
assuming that B = 0 (i.e., that the individual receives no transfer payment) and 
that the income tax is proportional in the sense that r = ~wh,  where T is the 
marginal tax rate. 
In figure 5.1, consumption of  goods is measured along the vertical axis, 
while leisure and hours of work are measured along the horizontal axis, where 
we make use of the fact that h = T -  L. The budget constraint is represented 
by  the line E-E with slope -  w(  1 -  T)  and intercept y. Z,,,  I,  and I, are indiffer- 
ence curves; that is, each such curve represents combinations of c and L such 
that the utility is constant along the curve. The farther away from the origin an 
indifference curve is located, the higher the utility level corresponding to the 
curve. To reach the highest possible utility level without violating the budget 
constraint, the individual will choose the combination of  goods and leisure 
consumption where an indifference curve becomes tangent to the budget con- 
straint. This occurs at point A in the figure, where we also find that h, represents 
the optimal hours of work. A key insight provided by the theory of consumer 
choice is that the response in the hours of  work to a change in the budget 
constraint can be decomposed into a substitution effect and an income effect. 
This is important in order to understand how to interpret the influence of eco- 
nomic policy such as taxes and transfer payments on hours of work. To illus- 
1. The “longest” long run would consider the effect of taxes and transfer programs on the size 
and age composition of the population. The effects of Sweden’s public policies on fertility and 
immigration are active topics of public discussion. For a discussion of the literature, see Walker 
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Fig. 5.1  Labor-leisure choice 
trate, suppose that the marginal tax rate increases from T to T', and consider 
figure 5.2. 
Prior to the change in the marginal tax rate, figure 5.2 coincides with figure 
5.1, meaning that the initial optimal hours of work are h,.  An increase in the 
marginal tax rate will change the slope of the budget constraint, and the new 
budget constraint is represented by the line E-E'  with slope -w(  1 -  7').  The 
new solution is given by the point D,  where the optimal hours of work are h,. 
To decompose the movement from h, to h, into a substitution effect and an 
income effect, suppose that following the policy change individuals were com- 
pensated with a lump-sum subsidy for the utility loss from increased marginal 
taxation. This would shift the new budget constraint (E-E')  outward to E'-B', 
which is tangent to the old indifference curve at point E The movement from 
A to D can now be decomposed into a substitution effect, A-F, and an income 
effect, F-D. The substitution effect of increased marginal taxation (a decrease 
in the marginal wage rate) is always nonpositive, which has to do with the fact 
that increased marginal taxation makes leisure cheaper relative to consumption 
goods. On the other hand, if leisure is a normal good (i.e., if leisure is positively 
related to real income), the income effect will increase the hours of work. Since 
most empirical studies of the labor supply have found that leisure is a normal 
good, the qualitative response in the hours of  work from increased marginal 
taxation depends on whether the substitution effect dominates the income ef- 
fect. The distinction between the substitution effect and the income effect is 206  Thomas Aronsson and James R. Walker 
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Fig. 5.2  Proportional income tax 
important for two reasons. First, following an increase in the marginal wage, 
economic theory requires that the substitution effect (i.e., the compensated 
wage effect) be nonnegative. The latter is usually referred to as the Slutsky 
condition. Second, the social loss of taxation is related to the substitution effect 
(but not to the income effect). The latter implies, for example, that lump-sum 
taxes, which do not affect the slope of the budget constraint, cause no social 
loss because there is no substitution effect involved. We will return to this issue 
in the next subsection, where the welfare effects of taxes and transfer programs 
are discussed. 
There is one special case where a change in the after-tax wage has an unam- 
biguous effect on labor supply. For individuals not participating in the labor 
market (i.e., those consuming full leisure and consumption y of market goods), 
if it has any effect at all, an increase in the wage can only increase labor supply. 
An increase in the market wage will then induce some nonparticipants to enter 
the labor market since for nonparticipants an increase in the market wage has 
only a substitution effect. 
Let us now complicate the analysis by assuming that taxes are progressive, 
but, for the time being, we will continue to assume that B = 0. In a progressive 
tax system, the marginal tax rate is positively related to income, although it is 
usually constant within given income intervals. To  simplify the analysis, sup- 
pose that only labor income is taxed and that the marginal tax rate, ~(wh),  is 
determined according to the tax schedule ~(wh)  = 0 if  wh  <  X,, ~(wh)  = T,  if 
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Fig. 5.3  Kinked and piecewise linear budget set 
lower and upper limits of the second tax bracket measured in terms of income. 
This means that the budget constraint will contain three segments, as illus- 
trated in figure 5.3. 
In figure 5.3, HI  and H, are the limits of the tax brackets expressed in terms 
of hours of work; that is, HI = X,/w,  and H2 = X4w. The budget constraint is 
represented by the heavily drawn kinked line. By starting at the point on the 
budget constraint where h = 0 and then  moving leftward  along the budget 
constraint, we see that the marginal wage, w[l -  ~(wh)]  is reduced each time 
the individual enters a new tax bracket. Since both  substitution and income 
effects  are involved, it is generally not possible to predict  the  influence  of 
piecewise linear taxation on the labor supply. However, some predictions can 
be made, as illustrated by the following example (borrowed from Blomquist 
1989). Suppose that the marginal tax rate on the second segment, that is, for h 
6  (HI,  H,),  is increased while it remains constant at the other segments. This 
means that for h >  HI the budget constraint is now replaced by the dotted line 
in figure 5.3. To be specific, we see that the first segment of the budget con- 
straint is the same as prior to the change. The second segment has a smaller 
slope than previously because of the increase in the marginal tax rate T~.  Fi- 
nally, the third segment is subject only to a parallel shift inward because indi- 
viduals on the third segment now pay more taxes on the part of their income 
that falls short of X,SKr.  What predictions are possible? If the initial hours of 208  Thomas Aronsson and James R. Walker 
work are located on the first segment, the tax reform will have no effect on 
behavior since the first segment of the budget constraint is not affected by the 
reform. If the prereform hours of work are located on the second segment, it is 
not possible to give a qualitative prediction because there is both a substitution 
effect and an income effect involved when the slope of the budget constraint 
is altered. Finally, if the prereform hours of work are located on the third seg- 
ment, there is only an income effect involved. The reason is that, although the 
consumption possibility is reduced when taxes are increased, the marginal tax 
rate remains constant. In this case, if leisure is a normal good, the hours of 
work will increase. 
What are the conclusions from this example? If we decrease the marginal 
tax rates corresponding to low-income tax brackets, a low-income individual 
would increase his or her labor supply if the substitution effect dominates the 
income effect. However, given that the marginal tax rates corresponding to 
high levels of income remain unaltered, an individual with high income would 
be subject only to an income effect, meaning that he or she would decrease 
hours of work if leisure is a normal good. Similarly, if we decrease the mar- 
ginal tax rates corresponding only to high levels of income, high-income indi- 
viduals  may  either  increase  or  decrease  their  labor  supply, depending  on 
whether the substitution effect dominates the income effect, while the behavior 
of individuals with low income would not be affected by the latter reform. 
Income-dependent transfer programs introduce nonlinearities in the budget 
constraint in a way  similar to progressive taxes. To see this, suppose that the 
transfer B in equation (1) decreases when income increases. This means that, 
if an individual has a sufficiently low level of income to qualify for the benefit, 
his or her effective marginal tax rate will be T(w~)  + B’, where B’  is the mar- 
ginal reduction of  benefits  when income increases. As income continues to 
increase, the benefit  will continue to decrease  and will  eventually  be zero. 
When that happens, the effective marginal tax rate becomes equal to the mar- 
ginal income tax rate, T(w~).  An important effect of income-dependent transfer 
programs is that they may introduce nonconvexities  in the budget set in the 
sense that the effective marginal tax rate decreases when income increases. 
When this occurs, we can no longer rule out the existence of multiple solutions 
to the utility-maximization  problem. As in the convex case, the concepts of 
substitution and income effects are still useful in analyzing labor market inter- 
vention. However, elasticities and other local measures of comparative statics 
are less meaningful here because a small change in the budget constraint may 
cause a large change in behavior. 
5.2.2  Welfare 
By introducing taxes and transfers, the government creates a wedge between 
the price a consumer pays and the price a producer receives. These wedges 
create distortions for the allocation of goods and services (see also Norman 209  The Effects of Sweden’s Welfare State on Labor Supply Incentives 
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Fig. 5.4  Excess burden based on the compensated variation 
and McLure, chap. 3 in this volume; and Rosen, chap. 2 in this volume). Dis- 
tortions are commonly measured by  the excess burden (or deadweight loss), 
which is the cost of a tax system beyond the revenue it collects. As explained 
by  King (1987) and Auerbach (1985), measures of  the excess burden suffer 
from an index number problem of whether post- or prereform prices are used 
as  a basis. Blomquist (1983) and Hausman  (1981) advocate Diamond and 
McFadden’s  measure of  the excess burden, which equals the compensating 
variation less the tax that would be collected at the compensated optimum. 
Blundell et al. (1988) and Aronsson (1993) define the excess burden as the 
equivalent variation less the tax collected at the individual’s optimum position. 
The compensating variation uses the posttax prices as a reference case and 
measures the income compensation required by  the individual to reach the 
same utility level as in the absence of the tax. The equivalent variation uses the 
(hypothetical) optimum in the absence of the tax as a reference case and mea- 
sures the income reduction that is equivalent to the tax in terms of  utility re- 
duction. 
These welfare measures are illustrated in figures 5.4 and 5.5. E,-E, is the 
pretax budget constraint, and E,,-E, is the posttax budget constraint. Point A is 
the optimum in the absence of taxes, while point B is the optimum in the pres- 
ence of the tax. In figure 5.4, the individual is compensated for the tax so as 
to restore the pretax utility level. The excess burden is then computed as the 
compensation required to achieve this (called the compensating variation) less 
the tax payment made at the compensated optimum (point C). In figure 5.5, 




Fig. 5.5  Excess burden based on the equivalent variation 
tion (called the equivaknt variation) is equivalent to the tax payment in terms 
of the loss of  utility. The excess burden is then  computed as the equivalent 
variation less the actual tax payment, that is, the tax payment at point B. 
The primary difficulty of using these welfare measures is moving from the 
individual to the society. If we admit differences in tastes or even in the distri- 
bution of income across individuals, any aggregate measure of the excess bur- 
den will depend on the distribution of income unless the utility function corre- 
sponds to the “Gorman polar form.”2 The problem is partly mitigated, although 
not eliminated, by looking at welfare changes within different interest (or tar- 
get) groups of consumers.  If  individuals are identical within  a group, then 
within-group comparisons across alternative reforms are well defined. Com- 
parison of gains and losses across groups, however, requires some subjective 
notion of equity. Rather than pushing measures of the excess burden this far, it 
can serve a descriptive role as a scalar measure to summarize the gains and 
losses of  tax reform. It places alternative reforms on a common footing and 
permits simple description of the distributional effects of a change in the tax 
or transfer ~ystem.~ 
The excess burden of a single tax increases with the curvature of the indiffer- 
ence curve (as measured  by  the  substitution effect)  and  increases with the 
2. The Gorman polar form requires that the expenditure function be written as e(p. u) = a(p) + 
ub(p),  for price vector p and utility u. The functions a@)  and b(p)  must be linearly homogeneous 
and concave. (See Deaton and Muellbauer 1980, 14-45,) 
3. For an insightful discussion, see King (1987). 211  The Effects of Sweden’s Welfare State on Labor Supply Incentives 
square of the tax rate.4 Even with a low compensated wage elasticity of labor 
supply, a high marginal tax rate can yield a large excess burden. Similarly, even 
at low marginal tax rates, a high compensated substitution effect may produce 
a large excess burden. 
5.2.3  Restrictions and Extensions 
The canonical model focuses on only two dimensions of labor supply, partic- 
ipation and hours of work, and even then it is highly stylized. Among the most 
restrictive assumptions are its static nature (individuals make one choice), its 
assumption of perfect certainty (workers have complete information on all jobs 
and on the economy), its simple characterization of jobs and particularly  the 
absence of consideration for the demand  side of the market (the wage is a 
sufficient statistic to describe a job, and workers have complete freedom to 
vary their hours of  work), and its emphasis on atomistic behavior  (workers 
make consumption and labor supply decisions in isolation from others, includ- 
ing family members). Tied to the static nature, with no opportunity to invest in 
skills (or education), the canonical model is silent on quality dimensions of 
labor supply. Each of these deficiencies have received attention in the literature, 
although not usually in connection with the tax and transfer ~ystem.~ 
Family Issues 
The simplest extension of the canonical model to incorporate family deci- 
sion making endows  the  household  with  preferences  defined over the  con- 
sumption and leisure of each member of the household, for example, U(c,,  c,, 
L,,  L,). Each individual in the household has a time constraint and can work in 
the labor market at an exogenously determined wage (although, of course, not 
necessarily  the  same wage). The key  insight is that,  since family members 
jointly determine their labor supply, the labor supply function for an individual 
in the household depends on the wage rates of all people in the household.h 
Dynamic Models 
maximize an intertemporally separable utility function: 
In order to construct a simple life-cycle  model,  suppose that individuals 
4. The effects of the tax are compared to the no-tax equilibrium because, by  the theory of  the 
second best, in the presence of  an initial distortion introducing an additional distortion may or may 
not decrease welfare (it may attenuate or exacerbate the preexisting situation). Also, with more 
than one good, we have to consider compensated cross-price effects (the off-diagonal terms of 
the Slutsky matrix), which may be positive or negative. However, most applications are partial 
equilibrium in nature and do not model the other distortions or demand for other commodities. 
Thus, in most applications, the intuition presented in the text will hold. 
5. Several surveys of labor supply cover these topics in detail and need not be repeated here 
(see Pencavel 1986; and Killingsworth and Heckman 1986). 
6. Empirical models of household labor supply as well as results from the estimation of  such 
models can be found in Ashenfelter and Heckman (1974). Hausman and Ruud (1984). Kapteyn, 
Kooreman, and van Soest (1990), and Aronsson (1993). 212  Thomas Aronsson and James R. Walker 
where c, and h,  represent consumption and hours of work in period t, and p is 
the rate of time preference. The dynamic budget constraint may be written as 
(3)  A, = (I + r)~,-~  + w,h,  -  r(w,h, + ‘A,-,) -  c,, 
where A,  is the asset at the end of period t, r is the interest rate, w,  is the hourly 
gross wage rate in period t,  and T(w,h,  + rA,-J is the tax payment in period t. 
How can we make this model empirically manageable if we do not have infor- 
mation on the path of  future wage rates? Following Blomquist (1985) and 
Blundell and Walker (1986), we note that together A, and  form a set of 
sufficient statistics for information about future periods. This means that, if we 
condition on the asset positions at the beginning and end of period t, it is pos- 
sible to rewrite the budget constraint in such a way that it becomes similar to 
that of the canonical model: 
(4) 
where p, = rA,-, -  S,,  and S,  =  A, -  Hence, p, is a measure of nonlabor 
income that is consistent with intertemporal optimization since it includes not 
only capital income as in static models but also saving. If the form of the utility 
function does not  change over  time, we  can  derive a  life-cycle-consistent 
within-period labor supply function by  maximizing u(c,, h,) subject to equa- 
tion (4).’ 
Just as in the household model of labor supply, where the labor supply func- 
tion of each individual in the household depends on the wage rates of all people 
in the household, in dynamic models of labor supply, labor force participation 
and hours of work depend on current and expected future wages and nonlabor 
income flows. The dependence on expected future wages and incomes implies 
that an anticipated future increase in a social insurance benefit or income tax 
rate may induce a labor supply response in the current period. Many of  Swe- 
den’s social insurance benefits are work conditioned (i.e., benefits depend on 
past labor supply; the public pension system is a leading example) and may 
induce complicated, dynamic labor supply responses as individuals attempt to 
become entitled to a higher-benefit stream. 
Human Capital Accumulation 
Models of human capital accumulation incorporate the possibility of spend- 
ing time in education as part of  the utility-maximization problem (see, e.g., 
7. Instead of conditioning on asset positions, Heckman and MaCurdy (1980) and MaCurdy 
(1981) condition on the marginal utility of  wealth and derive what are often referred to as  X- 
constant labor supply functions. However, the marginal utility of wealth will be a sufficient statistic 
for information about future periods only if the budget constraint is intertemporally separable, a 
condition that nonlinear taxation of capital income (which was the case in Sweden prior to the tax 
reform) violates. 213  The Effects of Sweden’s Welfare State on Labor Supply Incentives 
Blinder and Weiss  1976; and Heckman  1976). An  individual is assumed to 
allocate his or her time endowment between leisure, market work, and invest- 
ments, where the latter is defined as time spent in education. Time spent in 
education accumulates human capital (knowledge or skill), which, in turn, 
tends to increase the market wage rate. Hence, the incentive to spend time in 
education has to do with the assumption that the market wage rate is positively 
related to the stock of human capital. In a similar way, the opportunity cost is 
the forgone earnings during periods of investment. 
Taxes and transfer programs affect the incentives to spend time in education. 
This means that, in addition to distorting the life-cycle path of hours of work, 
taxes and transfer programs will also have an effect on the quality of the labor 
supply. In  appendix A, we illustrate within a simple model of  occupational 
choice how taxes and transfer programs affect the incentives to invest in human 
capital (see also Edin and Topel, chap. 4 in this volume). 
Other Behavioral Effects 
Another important insight is that, as marginal tax rates increase, workers 
have an incentive to seek nontaxable forms of compensation. If it is cost effec- 
tive for firms to use nontaxed sources of compensation, they will do so. Among 
other mechanisms, workers may receive compensation in the form of improved 
fringe benefits or increased on-the-job consumption. The wage is only one 
form of  compensation, and, as marginal tax rates increase, it becomes more 
costly. Some responses may  occur in quantity dimensions; however, with a 
large number of dimensions to the employment relation, the necessary equili- 
brating adjustments in any one dimension may be small and empirically diffi- 
cult to detect. This implies that the structure of  compensation is not indepen- 
dent of the tax system. 
Just as individuals have an incentive to minimize their tax liability by  ac- 
cepting nontaxed forms of compensation, they also have an incentive to lie to 
the tax authorities and underreport their taxable income. Tax evasion can be 
modeled as a form of  occupational choice-in  one job, within the covered 
sector, reporting rules imposed on the employer make it impossible for the 
employee to hide income from the tax authorities; in the other job, within the 
“uncovered” sector (or, more colorfully, the “underground” sector), it is pos- 
sible to hide (or shelter) income.*  Modern tax collection systems make nearly 
all employee jobs within the covered sector subject to withholding or other 
collection mechanisms. Self-employment is the prototypical example of a job 
in the “uncovered” sector. With a change in terminology, the analytic frame- 
work of  the occupational choice model can be used to investigate this issue 
(see Cowell 1990). 
Given Sweden’s overall high level of  taxation and benefits, the theory we 
8. It is interesting to note that many European countries adopted value added taxes (VAT) be- 
cause taxpayers did not voluntarily comply with income taxes. 214  Thomas Aronsson and James R. Walker 
have  reviewed  suggests possibly  large behavioral responses that  affect the 
quantity and quality of the labor supplied to the market. The theory makes it 
clear that the responses depend on the details of how programs affect budget 
sets. We  turn next to the detailed transfer and tax system. 
5.3  Sweden’s Transfer Programs 
Historians of Sweden’s welfare state recognize three epochs in its develop- 
ment. Phase 1 (1890-1930)  established national social assistance and social 
insurance programs. Programs in this phase are comprehensive in coverage but 
offer meager benefits. Phase 2 (1930-60)  established the basic safety net of 
welfare programs to guarantee an adequate standard of  living for all-the 
aged, the sick, the disabled, the unemployed, low-income families with chil- 
dren-without  the stigma of  the old poor law. Phase 3 (1960-90)  raised the 
income-replacement ratios to 80-90  percent of market income for those tem- 
porarily forced out of gainful employment, led the state to assume large-scale 
obligations for the care of  the elderly and children that previously had been 
provided within the family, and generalized social services previously available 
only in large urban areas to small towns and rural areas through massive mu- 
nicipal consolidation (Einhorn and Logue 1989). Hence, most programs date 
from the turn of the century, and, while their structure has remained unchanged 
since the first half of  the century, the rapid expansion of  costly entitlement 
programs is a relatively new  phenomenon. Reforms since 1990 suggest that 
Sweden has entered a new epoch, phase 4  (1990-),  an attempt to scale back 
the expansive entitlement programs. 
Next, we review the major entitlement programs expected to affect labor 
supply decisions. Table 5.1 summarizes the structure, expenditure, and recent 
changes in the largest programs. 
5.3.1  Pensions 
There are two national pension systems developed in Sweden to provide 
old-age, disability, and survivorship benefits. The basic pension began in 1948 
and provides flat-rate payments to all  pensioner^.^ The unusual feature of the 
basic pension is its universality-it  is a right of citizenship-no  work or con- 
tribution requirements exist. The second pension, called the National Supple- 
mentary Pension or ATP,  was introduced in 1960, began full payouts in  1969, 
and provides earnings-related payments. 
Benefits from the two public pension systems are related by a measure called 
the basic amount. Introduced in 1957, and indexed against inflation, the basic 
amount is thought to correspond to a yearly income for which a basic pension 
should be sufficient (Age11 1979). It has also become an index basis for other 
social benefits. 
9. Its predecessor began in  1913, was means tested, and guaranteed a minimum standard for 
everyone (Hansson-Brusewitz 1992, app. C). Table 5.1  Primary Social Insurance Programs 
Expenditure 
Main Form of Benefit in  in 1989  Changes during 
Program  1989  (SKr million)  the 1990s 
Pension system: 
Old age (basic  Flat rate payments to all 
and ATF’)  pensioners. Benefits are 
indexed for inflation and 
payable at age 65. 
replace 65% of 
pensionable income 
during the best 15 years 
Earnings related (ATP)  97,346“ 
Partial 
of employment. 
aged 60-65  with 10 or 
more years of 
employment after age 45. 
Workers replace 65% of 
forgone earnings from 
reduced hours of work. 
Workers retain right to 
draw a full pension at 
official retirement age. 
Disability  Covers individuals aged 
16-65  with reduced 
Available to individuals 
1,523 
In July 1994, minimum 
eligibility age increased to 
6 1, and replacement rate 
reduced to 55% of 
forgone earnings. Workers 
may reduce hours of work 
by at most 10 hours per 
week. 
capacity to work. Has 
same structure of basic 
and supplementary 
pensions as old-age 
system. Supplementary 
22,060 
benefits based on 
potential earnings (if not 
disabled). 
Health insurance  Public health and hospitals.  84,143 
Sickness cash benefits 
replace 90% of earnings. 
Benefits start on the first day 
of illness. 
55,611 
Several reforms during the 
1990s reduced the 
replacement rate and 
increased the waiting 
period for coverage. By 
1993, no benefits paid for 
the first day of illness; for 
the second and third days, 
65% of normal earnings 
replaced. Maximum 
replacement rate is 80% 
on fourth day of illness. In 
1996, the replacement 
rate was set to 75% from 
the second day. 
paid directly by the 
employer. Replaces public 
sickness benefits for first 
two weeks of illness. 
Instituted “sickness wage” 
(continued) 216  Thomas Aronsson and James R. Walker 
Table 5.1  (continued) 
Expenditure 
Main Form of Benefit in  in 1989  Changes during 
Program  1989  (SKr million)  the 1990s 





Child  Paid monthly to child’s 
allowances  guardian until child 
becomes age 16. Annual 





for third and higher-order 
births. 
At childbirth, parents share 
450 days of benefits, 360 
of which replace 90% of 
the earnings, and earnings  12,145 
for the remaining 90 days 
replaced at the 
guaranteed rate of SKr 
60.00 per day. 
10%  of publicly provided  22,313 
child-center care. 
Child care  Parents pay approximately 
July 1993 replacement rates 
decreased to 80%, and 
benefit period begins on 
the sixth day of 
unemployment. 
New (more stringent) 
eligibility rules in July 
1994. 
Supplementary allowances 
for higher-order births 
reduced by  approximately 
half and were finally 
abolished in the mid- 
1990s. Basic allowance 
reduced. 
In July 1994, eliminated the 
90 days paid at the 
guaranteed rate. 
Reinstated in January 
1995. The replacement 
rate was reduced to 75% 
in  1996. 
Source: Expenditure estimates from Srutistisk hbok  1992 (Stockholm: Statistics Sweden), table 365. 
“Includes SKr 4,356 million as special housing allowance for the aged. Pension expenditures equal De- 
cember expenditures multiplied by twelve; all other expenditures are annual values. 
The basic pension  benefit is a fixed multiple of the basic  amount. Since 
1968, single individuals receive 95 percent of the basic amount, and married 
couples, both of retirement age, receive 155 percent of the basic amount. Prior 
to 1968, these payout proportions were 5.5 percentage points lower for singles 
and 10.2 percentage points lower for married couples. 
The earnings-related ATP covers all individuals over age sixteen with earn- 
ings above the basic amount for at least three years since 1960. ATP benefits 
accrue on pensionable income, defined as all employment-related income (e.g., 
wages, salary, sickness benefits, parental benefits) between 1 and 7.5 times the 
basic amount. Entitlement to a full supplementary pension requires thirty years 217  The Effects of Sweden’s Welfare State on Labor Supply Incentives 
of work. Full supplementary pension benefits are reduced by one-thirtieth for 
each year of pensionable income less than thirty. A full ATP pension replaces 
60 percent of the pensionable income earned during the worker’s best fifteen 
years (since 1960).1° 
In addition to the public old-age pension, there are also certain contractual 
pensions. These contractual pensions are not part of the legislation; rather, they 
are determined by agreement between the parties in the labor market. The ben- 
efits are paid out according to centralized negotiated agreements. There are 
in principle four such contractual pension  systems: (1) pensions to national 
government employees; (2) pensions to local government employees; (3) pen- 
sions to white-collar workers in private employment; and (4) pensions to blue- 
collar workers in private employment. The contractual pensions are not coordi- 
nated with the public old-age pensions but supplement the public pensions. 
Since 1963, Swedish workers have had the right to draw basic pension bene- 
fits starting at age sixty-three or wait until age seventy. Until July  1976, the 
official retirement  age to receive full benefits was age sixty-seven. Workers 
retiring before the official age receive benefits for the entire retirement period 
reduced by 0.6 percent per month for each month of early retirement. Workers 
postponing benefits also receive benefits for the retirement period higher by 
0.6 percent per month. A major reform in 1976 gave workers additional flexi- 
bility. The pension reform in  1976 reduced the official age of retirement for 
full benefits to age sixty-five. The penalty for early retirement was reduced to 
0.5 percent per month. (The reward for postponing retirement was unaffected.) 
Most important, the 1976 reform introduced the partial pension system. Indi- 
viduals age sixty to sixty-five with earnings of  at least one basic amount for 
ten or more years after age forty-five are eligible to receive a partial pension. 
Workers accepting a partial pension retain eligibility for full pension benefits 
at the official retirement age. To receive a partial pension, the individual must 
reduce hours of work by at least five hours per week and must work between 
seventeen and thirty-four hours following the reduction. The partial pension 
replaces a fraction of the earnings lost by the work reduction. From July 1976 
until January  1981, 65 percent of  the forgone earnings were replaced. From 
January 1981 until June 1987, the replacement rate was reduced to SO percent. 
In July 1987, the replacement rate was returned to 65 percent. Recent legisla- 
tion tightened the requirements and reduced the benefits of the partial pension. 
As of  1 July 1994, the minimum entitlement age increased from sixty to sixty- 
one, and workers are allowed to reduce their hours of work by no more than 
10. In 1969, a general supplement to the basic pension was implemented for low earners, essen- 
tially the recently retired who were not fully vested in the earnings-related ATP pension. The basic 
pension supplement was tied to the basic amount at 3 percent with a graduated rate of increase of 
3 percentage points for every year of work after 1969 until 1976, when the graduated rate increases 
to 4 percentage points per year of work until 1981, when the maximum supplement of 45 percent 
is reached. The basic pension supplement is reduced krona for krona by the amount of ATP bene- 
fits received. 218  Thomas Aronsson and James R. Walker 
ten hours per week. Importantly, the replacement rate of forgone earnings was 
reduced to 55  percent. 
Since its inception, the public pension system has included a disability pen- 
sion for individuals with reduced work capacity due to illness or injury. Indi- 
viduals aged sixteen to sixty-five are eligible to receive a disability pension if 
their work capacity has been reduced by at least 50 percent.” (Individuals with 
partial  disabilities may  receive partial disability pensions of  either half  or 
three-quarters of the full pension.) The disability pension is structured in the 
same way as the public old-age pension and contains a basic and supplemen- 
tary pension. To  calculate the supplementary part of  the disability pension, 
pension points are assigned on the earnings assumed had the individual been 
able to work (e.g., “assumed pension points”). The assumed pensions points 
are constant over time and are calculated either as (1) the average pension 
points obtained in the best two of four previous years of pensionable income 
or (2) the average of the pension points obtained during the better half of the 
earnings history. 
Since 1960, regulations governing eligibility for disability pensions have 
changed several times. In June 1970, in addition to medical conditions, special 
consideration was  to be given to labor market conditions of  the older (age 
sixty-three and above) insured individuals. The premise is that “older workers 
are not to be forced to change location or occupation” (Wadensjo 1985,5). By 
July 1972, it became possible to grant a disability pension to an individual age 
sixty-three or older solely for labor market conditions. Since July  1976, the 
age limit for both medical and labor market reasons was lowered to sixty. Also, 
since July  1977, consideration of  disability should be  independent of  the 
causes of  reduced working capacity. The “no-fault” disability pensions gave 
wider latitude to alcoholism, drug addition, and “sociopathy” as approved di- 
agnoses (Wadensjo 1985,7). 
The pension funds have never been actuarial programs. Prior to 1975, em- 
ployee contributions and central and local government contributions from gen- 
eral revenue financed the national basic pension scheme. Employee contribu- 
tions for the basic pensions were levied at a flat rate of  5 percent on their 
taxable income (maximum contribution SKr 1,500). The supplementary pen- 
sion plan (ATP) never required direct employee contributions; instead, contri- 
butions were paid through a payroll tax on the employer’s tax bill. In  1975, 
employee contributions for the basic pension were abolished and their share 
offset by an increase in the payroll tax levied on employers. 
5.3.2  Health Insurance and Health Services 
In the mid-nineteenth century, voluntary sickness benefit societies arose to 
provide their members health care and income loss protection during a time of 
11. Individuals with long-term illnesses of one to two years usually receive disability pensions 
automatically. 219  The Effects of Sweden’s Welfare State on Labor Supply Incentives 
illness. The extent of program coverage as well as cash benefits provided by 
the voluntary societies were idiosyncratic. Labor unions began lobbying for 
national health insurance in the early 1920s. Overcoming strong resistance by 
the medical profession, national health insurance was enacted in 1955. In 1963, 
the system was integrated into the national insurance system that includes pen- 
sions and work injury insurance. 
Although many  changes have been made to the generosity of benefits, the 
basic structure of the program remains unchanged since its inception in 1955. 
The program has two components. First, like most other social insurance pro- 
grams in Sweden, there is a universal component, and all individuals are elig- 
ible to receive the guaranteed benefit. Second, there is a supplemental benefit 
tied to the individual’s employment history to protect earnings against loss dur- 
ing illness. Major increases in benefit levels occurred in 1963, 1967, and 1974. 
Benefits were not indexed for inflation at this time, and the increases in 1963 
and  1967 increased the guaranteed benefit in real terms and maintained the 
after-tax replacement rate of  the supplemental benefits at approximately 80 
percent. From their introduction until the 1967 reform, benefits started on the 
fourth day (three days of coinsurance) of the illness and were, in principle, of 
unlimited duration. A physician’s certificate was needed after the eighth day. In 
1967, the waiting period decreased to one day. 
The 1974 reform of the health system integrated all health services and made 
all cash benefits taxable and pensionable income. The minimum replacement 
ratio was 64 percent from the second day and rose to replace 90 percent of 
earnings.I2  A 1987 reform eliminated the one-day waiting period, as sickness 
insurance cash benefits replaced 90 percent of  earnings from the first day of 
illness and no “free days” were deducted. Benefits were reduced in March 1991 
and replaced 65 percent of normal income for the first three days of illness, 80 
percent from the fourth to the ninetieth day of illness, and 90 percent thereafter. 
A reform in April 1993 made an additional reduction of benefits. There was no 
benefit for the first day of sickness. For the second and third days, the replace- 
ment ratio was 65 percent of gross earnings. For the fourth day of sickness, the 
replacement ratio was 80 percent. Since 1996, the replacement rate is 75 per- 
cent from the second day of illness. Individuals who have been on sick leave for 
more than one year receive 70 percent of their income. Since 1992, employed 
individuals are entitled to a sickness wage paid directly by the employer. The 
sickness wage replaces health insurance benefits in the first fourteen days of 
illness. 
12. The statutory replacement rate was 90 percent of earnings. The daily replacement rate equals 
90 percent of normal twelve-month earnings divided by  365. For the first week of sickness, only 
normal working days are covered, and benefits are not paid for normal days off  (known as the 
“free-day” rule). No more than two free days can be deducted. If  the sickness period lasts more 
than a week, no days off will be deducted either during the first week or during subsequent weeks 
of illness. 220  Thomas Aronsson and James R. Walker 
5.3.3  Child-Rearing Benefits 
Sweden has an extensive system of family benefits that may affect time allo- 
cation within the household and to the marketplace. We briefly describe the 
programs below. 
Child Allowances 
Each child in Sweden receives a general allowance until the age of sixteen. 
This allowance is tax free and is paid monthly to the child’s guardian. These 
child allowances are in lieu of income tax deductions as in the United  state^.'^ 
From August 1948 until July 1983, allowances were roughly indexed to infla- 
tion and were the same for each birth. In 1993, the annual basic child allowance 
was SKr 9,000. In January  1983, a supplement to the basic child allowance 
was introduced for third and higher-order births. By 1989, the supplemental 
allowance was 50 percent for the third child, 190 percent for the fourth, 240 
percent for the fifth, and 160 percent for the sixth and subsequent children. In 
1991, and again in 1994, the supplemental allowances have been reduced for 
birth orders 4 and above. After the reform in 1994, the supplemental allowance 
was 100 percent for the fourth and subsequent children. The supplemental al- 
lowance was abolished and the basic allowance reduced in 1996. 
Maternity and Parental Benefits 
Sweden has been  at the forefront in  legislating  child-related  benefits. In 
1955, maternity benefits were made universal as part of the coverage provided 
by national health insurance. Prior to this time, childbirth benefits were pro- 
vided  by  membership  in voluntary  recognized  insurance  societies. Means- 
tested benefits were available since 1938 to women who were not members of 
the insurance societies. The passage of national health insurance abolished the 
maternity benefits provided by  the insurance societies. The maternity benefit 
system followed the usual program structure with a universal minimum benefit 
guarantee and an earnings-related supplemental component to replace earnings 
in the event of childbirth. The maximum duration of the benefits was 180 days. 
The compulsory maternity benefit was repealed in 1974 and replaced by  the 
parental benefit program. In 1974, either parent (but not both simultaneously) 
could receive benefits in connection with childbirth. Several program revisions 
increased the generosity of childbirth benefits. In 1993, the couple shared 360 
days with the replacement rate of 90 percent of gross earnings up to seven and 
a half times the basic amount and another 90 days at the guaranteed rate of 
13. There are some differences between European countries regarding how support to families 
with dependent children is organized. These differences are primarily (a)  whether child allowances 
are income dependent and (b)  whether tax deductions are related to family composition. For ex- 
ample, in the German system, child allowances are income dependent, and there is also a special 
deduction called the child fax allowance, which depends on the number of children (see Zimmer- 
mann 1993). 221  The Effects of Sweden’s Welfare State on Labor Supply Incentives 
SKr 60.00 per day.14  The replacement rate was reduced to 80 percent in 1994 
and to 75 percent in 1996. The benefits can be used anytime until the child’s 
eighth birthday. 
Expansion of child-care facilities was regarded in Sweden as the most im- 
portant family policy issue of the 1970s. Even after substantial expenditures, 
by  the early  1980s sizable “excess demand” for child day-care services re- 
mained. Continued expansion of the public child-care sector during the 1980s 
eliminated most of the excess demand, especially in large urban regions such 
as Stockholm, Gothenburg, and Malmo. Child-care programs are a municipal 
responsibility. These programs are financed primarily through local tax reve- 
nues and parental fees. Most communities have fees that vary according to the 
income of the parents. Until recently, parental fees typically covered a small 
fraction (about  10 percent) of  the operating costs (Gustafsson and Stafford 
1992). Parental fees have increased lately. 
5.3.4  Housing Policy 
Sweden formulated a national housing policy in 1948 when it established 
the National Swedish Housing Board as the central housing authority. An un- 
derlying principle of the housing policy was to provide the entire population 
with healthy, spacious, and functionally equipped housing of good quality at 
reasonable prices. 
A  major  government  policy  instrument  for one-family  owner-occupied 
dwellings has been interest deductibility of  mortgage interest payments. An- 
other major government instrument in housing policy has been in home fi- 
nancing. The central  government has provided  low-interest  and subsidized 
long-term loans for housing construction. 
A third policy instrument is housing allowances available to the elderly and 
to families, especially low-income families with children. Both types of hous- 
ing allowances are administered by the communities within rules prescribed 
by the central government. The legislation on housing allowances for families 
with children is complicated by frequent changes in benefit levels and income 
restrictions. However, with one exception, the structure of  the program has 
remained constant. Prior to 1958, housing allowances were restricted to fami- 
lies with two or more children under the age of sixteen. In 1958, housing allow- 
ances were extended to families with only one child (under age sixteen). The 
age limit on children was increased to seventeen in 1972. Housing allowances 
were extended to childless families and individuals in 1974. 
During the period  1948-68,  the central government administered housing 
allowances, although payments varied slightly within region.I5 The number of 
14. In July 1994, the ninety days at the (low) guaranteed rate were abolished. From 1995, one 
month of the parental leave is reserved for the father (and cannot be transferred to the mother). 
15. Housing allowances increased with the number of children up to and including the sixth 
child. The additional benefits per child are equal to the difference in benefits for families with two 
vs. three children. 222  Thomas Aronsson and James R. Walker 
families receiving housing allowances peaked in the late  1970s. During the 
1980s, income ceilings were not increased for inflation, and the number of 
families eligible to receive benefits declined. Benefit levels were improved in 
the late 1980s and restored some of the loss suffered in the 1980s. 
A major transformation of housing allowances occurred in 1969. In addition 
to state (central) government allowances, a state-community housing allow- 
ance system began in 1969. The state-subsidized municipal housing allowance 
covers 80  percent of the monthly housing (rental) cost within prescribed limits. 
A second change in 1969 revised the application of  the income restrictions. 
From 1969, housing benefits were reduced by a fraction of income in excess 
of  the income limit qualifying for a standard allowance. The percentage ap- 
plied to reduce benefits increased with income. These limits have also changed 
several times. The implicit marginal tax rates vary by the number of children 
in the household and whether it is a single-parent household. 
Housing allowances are paid from local income tax revenue. The central 
government also provides financing for the housing allowances and supplies 
the state loans and interest subsidies out of general tax revenues. 
5.3.5  Unemployment Insurance 
Unemployment insurance is administered by recognized unemployment in- 
surance societies, which historically have been operated by trade unions. Soci- 
ety membership was voluntary until  1974, when membership by trade union 
members became compulsory. Unions continued their responsibility with little 
change after  1974 when payroll taxes on employers were introduced to help 
fund unemployment benefits. 
To be eligible for unemployment insurance, a society member must register 
with the local employment office and be fit, able, and willing to work. The 
individual must also have been a member of the society (and making contribu- 
tions) for the previous twelve months and during this period have been em- 
ployed seventy-five or more hours per month for at least five months or sixty- 
five hours per month for ten months. Benefits are taxable and, prior to 1 July 
1993, replaced 90 percent of gross earnings up to a maximum SKr of 598 per 
day. From  1 July 1993, the replacement rate declined to 80 percent of  gross 
earnings, and, since 1 September 1993, the benefit period begins as of the sixth 
day of  unemployment. The replacement rate was reduced  to 75 percent  in 
1996. Prime-age workers may receive uninterrupted cash payments for a maxi- 
mum of 300 days (five days per week). Members fifty-five to sixty-four years 
old are entitled to receive benefits for up to 450 days.16 
16. It is interesting to make comparisons with other European countries regarding the generosity 
of  the unemployment insurance benefit. In Denmark, the official replacement rate is 90 percent, 
but this rate is supplemented with a rather low benefit maximum (which gives an average degree 
of compensation of about 65 percent). The Danish system has no waiting period for unemployment 
insurance benefits, and the duration of the benefit period is 2.5 years (Pedersen 1993). In Germany, 223  The Effects of Sweden’s Welfare State on Labor Supply Incentives 
Individuals who are not members of a recognized unemployment society are 
also eligible for unemployment cash benefits,  although under less-favorable 
conditions than  those of the societies. These benefits  fall within the  “labor 
market cash assistance” program. The program is administered by the National 
Insurance Board, and one-third is financed  out of general  tax revenues  and 
two-thirds from employers’ fees. The state eligibility requirements for public 
unemployment benefits are the same as those of the societies. However, em- 
ployment is defined liberally, and claimants therefore need have no work record 
to receive benefits (Wilson 1979,82).  The cash assistance program is extended 
to new labor market entrants and other nonmembers of the recognized unem- 
ployment insurance societies. 
5.3.6  Educational System and Policy 
The Swedish educational system has undergone a continuing series of  re- 
forms since the  1950s. Since the early 1960s, the system has had four major 
components, compulsory primary school, voluntary secondary school, univer- 
sity and other forms of  higher education (hogskola), and an extensive adult 
education system. All individuals receive nine years of primary education (ages 
seven to sixteen). Also, children are entitled to at least one year of preschool 
before starting (the preschools are part of the public child-care programs and 
do not belong to the regular school system). Secondary school offers schooling 
tracks of two, three, or four years’ duration and also a large number of special- 
ized courses of varying length. The latter may follow compulsory school or a 
previously completed line of secondary school. Secondary schools offer both 
academic programs of study in preparation for university entrance and voca- 
tional studies for a broad range of technical fields. A major reform of the voca- 
tional education system is currently under way.  The reform will standardize 
vocational education in Sweden. Vocational lines of study will be made more 
uniform, and the reforms are designed to confer wider and deeper knowledge 
compared with the previous system of vocational education. 
The higher education system was unified through a major reform in  1977. 
The reform created a single, coherent system for all types of postsecondary 
education, decentralized decision making, and broadened admissions policies. 
There are thirty-five higher education institutions (mostly colleges) in Sweden, 
all (save one) central government agencies. Their employees are national civil 
servants, and their students pay no tuition. A fundamental principle of Swedish 
higher education is that all students who need help  to finance their studies 
should receive assistance from the central government  for this purpose. The 
aid takes the form of  student grants and loans, generally called study assis- 
tance. The grants are means-tested but consider only the candidate’s income 
unemployed persons receive unemployment insurance benefits equal to 68 percent of their previ- 
ous earnings. After one year, this system is replaced with what is called unemployment assisrance, 
with  (in principle) unlimited duration, where the replacement rate is 58 percent (Zimmermann 
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and resources and disregard the financial resources of the student’s partner and 
or parents. Study assistance is roughly indexed for inflation and consists of a 
taxable nonrepayable grant (usually 30 percent) plus a larger repayable loan. 
The interest rate on the repayable loan portion is quite low, half the state de- 
posit rate. Repayment schedules for the loan are income related, with a general 
rule of 4 percent of annual income. The rate of interest is fixed annually by the 
government, and the interest payments are not tax deductible. 
5.4  The Tax System 
To pay for this extensive system of benefits, by the late 1980s Sweden had 
the highest tax burden  among OECD countries. The most  important direct 
taxes are the national and local income taxes. The most important indirect taxes 
are the value added tax and the social security payroll tax on employers. In this 
section, we describe the development and the administration of  these various 
tax schemes.” 
5.4.1  Indirect Taxes 
A sales tax of 4.17 percent was reintroduced in Sweden in 1960 (it had been 
abolished in 1948). The base of the sales tax included most consumption items, 
even basic items such as food. The sales tax was increased several times during 
the 1960s and by the end of the decade equaled 11.1 percent. In 1969, the sales 
tax was superseded by an 11.1 percent value added tax. Sweden’s general pol- 
icy has been to increase the value added tax to offset revenue losses from re- 
ductions in the national income tax rates (1  97 1 and 199  1). Consequently, as is 
evident from figure 5.6, except for a few temporary reductions, the value added 
tax increased steadily. Since the fall of 1992, the value added tax is 25 percent, 
with a few exceptions. The value added tax on food was reduced to 12 percent 
in 1996. 
As a general rule, social security contributions have been formally levied on 
the employer in the form of  payroll taxes. Prior to 1975, employees paid 5 
percent of their taxable income for the basic pension and a compulsory health 
insurance fee that depended on income and region. However, in 1993, a minor 
employee contribution was reintroduced in the form of a health insurance fee. 
As of  1 January 1994, employees are also required to pay an unemployment 
insurance fee. Social security contributions by employers cover approximately 
40 percent of the cost of social insurance programs (pensions and health insur- 
ance programs). The remaining 60 percent is paid from general revenues of 
the national and local governments. With the exception of the National Supple- 
mentary Pension charge that is levied only on incomes within 7.5 times the 
basic amount, and unlike social security taxes in the United States, social secu- 
rity contributions are levied without an earnings limit. 
17. For more information, see Norrman and McLure (chap. 3 in this volume). 225  The Effects of Sweden’s Welfare State on Labor Supply Incentives 
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Fig. 5.6  The value added tax 
Figure 5.7 shows the pattern of  Swedish payroll tax rates over time as a 
percentage of  gross wage rates. The remarkable increase in tax rates reflects 
the increasing generosity of Sweden’s social insurance programs. Only the eco- 
nomic slowdown of the late 1970s broke the sequence of steady rate increases. 
Subsequently, rate increases were confined to three years,  1983, 1987, and 
1991. Concerned about its competitive position in international markets, Swe- 
den made substantial reductions in the payroll tax in 1992 and 1993 and re- 
turned rates to their late 1970s level. 
5.4.2  Income Tax 
Sweden has an integrated and complex income tax system. Individuals pay 
both a local and a national income tax. Each resident with income above a 
minimum level must file an income tax return.I8  The national government de- 
termines the tax base for both national and local income taxes, but each locality 
(communities and counties) has the authority to set its own rate. Generally, the 
same rules governing exemptions and deductions apply, and individuals file 
only one return for both local and national taxes. Local income taxes are pro- 
portional, while the national income tax is progressive. Tax schedules change 
nearly every year, and, since 1960, two major tax reforms have occurred. The 
first, in 1971, defined the individual as the unit of taxation and established one 
national tax schedule independent of  marital status and household composi- 
18. In addition to individuals actually living in Sweden, residents include any Swede with strong 
links to Sweden. A Swedish citizen can be taxed in Sweden for five years after departure unless 
he or she can show that a strong link to Sweden does not exist (Andersson 1986,3). 226  Thomas Aronsson and James R. Walker 
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Fig. 5.7  The payroll tax 
tion. The second reform, in 1991, simplified the national tax schedule and es- 
tablished more uniform taxation for different sources of income. To appreciate 
the radical nature of the  1991 reform, and because most empirical studies of 
taxes and labor supply analyze data from the old regime, we discuss the rules 
of the pre-1991 tax system. 
Swedish tax law recognized  six sources of income: agriculture, business, 
employment, housing, capital, and casual economic activities (capital gains). 
All receipts were classified into one of these six classes. Each class had its own 
set of deductions that could be applied only against income within the class. 
However, a loss in one class could be deducted from income in other classes 
to reduce the total taxable income. Only a few sources of  income were tax 
exempt-housing  allowances, child allowances, and maintenance allowances 
from a former partner are the primary examples. Since 1974, pension benefits, 
sickness insurance payments, and unemployment cash benefits are taxable. All 
labor income is taxable, including an imputed value of nonmonetary benefits 
(e.g., a company automobile). What made the Swedish tax system so complex 
is that each person's  income was divided between two income categories: A 
(earned) and B (capital). The  1971 tax reform required  that individuals  be 
taxed separately on their A incomes. Couples living together were taxed jointly 
on their pooled capital income. 
Until the  1991 reform, the imputed income from owner-occupied housing 
was  taxable. The tax  on owner-occupied  housing  was progressive,  ranging 
from 2 to 6 percent of the assessed value. However, rules governing the deduct- 227  The Effects of Sweden’s Welfare State on Labor Supply Incentives 
ibility of mortgage interest were generous and frequently produced a loss from 
housing income. 
Even before the restrictions on deductions in the 1991 tax reform, the avail- 
ability of deductions and tax credits in Sweden was much more limited than 
in the United States. As a rule, deductions are allowed only for expenses neces- 
sary for obtaining the income. Various tax credits gave some tax relief to target 
populations (e.g., the poor, the elderly, and single-headed households with de- 
pendent children); however, as a general rule, since 1971 Sweden has had no 
special tax rules or deductions based on household composition. 
Sweden enacted a radical change in the tax system to take effect as of  1 
January 1991. With the goal of  making the system more neutral, and to treat 
different kinds of  income more equally, the reform broadened  the tax base 
and sharply reduced tax rates. Now, every attempt is made to tax all types of 
compensation (monetary and nonmonetary) for labor and capital on an equal 
basis and at market value. Some previously exempted fringe benefits are now 
taxed, and fringe benefits that were previously taxed (e.g., the use of a com- 
pany automobile) are now taxed at a higher rate. The 1991 tax reform implies 
that individuals with income under SKr 170,000 pay only the local tax (which 
remains proportional at around 30 percent), while individuals with higher in- 
comes also pay a 20 percent national income tax. The distinction between A 
and B income and the joint household taxation of B income had been gradually 
eliminated during the 1980s. The reform eliminated the income tax on the flow 
of housing services and instituted a separate proportional tax of 30 percent on 
capital income (including capital gains). The 1991 tax reform also severely 
restricted deductions to offset income. 
Income tax rates in Sweden are high. Figure 5.8 presents the time-series 
profile of average local tax rates. The decentralization and expansion of local 
government services are evident from the rapidly rising local tax rates during 
the 1960s and 1970s. Figure 5.9 represents the relation between posttax and 
pretax income for calendar years 1980, 1989, and 1991. The steep progressi- 
vity of the Swedish national tax system before the 1991 reform is evident from 
figure 5.9. In 1980, the marginal tax rates of the national income tax schedule 
ranged from 0 to 58 percent. Average tax rates of 50 percent were not unusual; 
local and national tax schedules combined to produce marginal tax rates of 
over 70 percent. Indeed, tax limitation rules were enacted in 1980 to limit the 
maximum marginal tax rate at 85 percent. During the  1980s, a series of re- 
forms reduced the number of income brackets and national tax rates. For ex- 
ample, whereas the 1980 national tax schedule had eighteen income brackets, 
the 1991 tax schedule has only two. 
5.5  Effects of Taxes and Transfers on Swedish Work Effort 
We review the budget set in 1981 and 1991 for three representative types of 
individuals to gain an appreciation of the effect of Sweden’s changing tax and 228  Thomas Aronsson and James R. Walker 
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Fig. 5.8  The local tax, 1950-93 
social policies  on individual work incentives. We  then combine knowledge 
from formal econometric analyses of  taxes and labor supply with recent de- 
scriptive evidence on time-series trends and cross-sectional patterns to com- 
plete our evaluation of taxes and labor supply incentives. 
5.5.1  Budget Sets 
As Becker (1962) forcefully argued, most of our predictions on individual 
behavior come from changes in the budget set. It is, therefore, the natural de- 
vice to summarize the structure of programs and taxes facing Swedish house- 
holds. To focus our discussion, we compare budget sets from 1981 and 1991 
for three types of individuals. We chose 1981 to represent the pre-1991 tax 
system characterized by its complicated mix of income-dependent programs 
and fine-grained national tax schedule. The last year is the important “low- 
marginal” tax system reflecting the 1991 reform. While many of  the budget 
sets and implicit marginal tax rates exhibit stark changes from 1981 to 1991, 
it is important to recall that a decade of piecewise reforms separate these sys- 
tems; comparisons between these systems overstate the short-run change faced 
by any household. 
For each of the representative individual types, we present two sets of fig- 
ures: (1) after-tax household income as a function of annual hours of work and 
(2) the implicit marginal tax rate (the sum of the value added tax, the marginal 
income tax from the national and local tax schedules, and the reduction of 
income-dependent benefits, e.g., housing benefits), also as a function of annual 
hours of work. Using the estimates reported in Anderson (1989) and Anders- 229  The Effects of Sweden’s Welfare State on Labor Supply Incentives 
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son and Gustafsson (1992), we incorporate deductions for work-related  ex- 
penses  and  union  dues. The schedules include  standard deductions  and, in 
1981, the rules for tax reductions and tax 1imitati0n.l~  We  include the VAT 
under the assumption that consumer prices increase by the full amount of an 
increase in the VAT.2o  Because of Sweden’s penchant for substituting consump- 
tion taxes for income taxes, it is necessary to include the VAT  in order accu- 
rately to measure the marginal tax rate facing consumers. There are other so- 
cial programs and fees that will affect the budget set and implicit marginal tax 
rates for (small) subsets of the population.2’ One important simplification is 
that households are assumed to have no capital income. Implicit marginal tax 
rates calculated under this assumption are a lower bound (at given hours of 
work and earned income) for individuals with a large positive capital income. 
19. For other representations of the budget set, see Andersson (1  989), Andersson and Gustafsson 
(1992), and Andersson and Klevmarken (1993). 
20. The VAT changed by only 1.5 percentage points between 1981 and 1991, and our estimates 
of implicit marginal tax rates are not sensitive to the assumed incidence of the VAT.  Results in 
Ballard, Scholz, and Shoven (1987) suggest that a more important issue is the number and type of 
exemptions to VAT. 
21. For example, households with children in public day-care centers pay fees according to their 
household income. How these situations affect the budget set and implicit tax rate can be found 
in Gustafsson and Klevmarken (1993). Gustafsson and Klevmarken exclude the VAT  and report 
the implicit marginal tax rate by  household income. We  include the VAT  and report the budget 
sets and the implicit marginal tax rates by hours of work for a given household member to isolate 
the incentive effects on labor supply. 230  Thomas Aronsson and James R. Walker 
Because of the joint taxation of capital income in 1981, capital income affects 
the 1981 more than the 1991 calculations. Another simplification is the neglect 
of the incentive effects created by the social insurance system (e.g., sickness 
benefits, pension benefits)-a  consequence of the atemporal nature of these 
budget sets. However, even in a dynamic framework, these incentive effects 
would be difficult to measure.** 
To eliminate the effects of the wage growth between  1981 and  1991 (real 
female wages grew at an annual growth of  1.5 percent, while real male wages 
grew  1.3 percent annually between  1981 and  1991), real wages are fixed at 
their 1991 value. That is, wages in 1991 equal the gender-specific manufactur- 
ing wage, while wages in  1981 equal the appropriate  1991 value deflated by 
the consumer price index. (Because of  the  wage growth between  1981 and 
1991, these wages are higher than the actual 1981 manufacturing wages.) The 
manufacturing wage is slightly higher than the median wage in the population, 
but, given the tight distribution of Swedish wages, it is nevertheless representa- 
tive of the average wage. 
Single Mule 
The three panels of figure 5.10 report the budget set for a single male with 
no children for a low-wage worker (half the manufacturing wage), an average 
wage worker (wage equal to the manufacturing wage), and a high-wage worker 
(twice the manufacturing wage). The panels of  figure 5.11 report the corre- 
sponding implicit marginal tax rate. Half to twice the manufacturing wage cov- 
ers all but the highest-wage workers in Sweden. Female wages are 90 percent 
of male wages, so comparable figures for single women will therefore be quite 
similar to those presented in figures 5.10 and 5.1 1. 
Several general patterns appear in figures 5.10 and 5.11 that hold for the 
other representative households. The greatest gains from the 1991 tax reform 
accrue to high-wage individuals as they benefit from the substantial reduction 
in marginal tax rates. Low-wage individuals with low labor market attachment 
(below 750 hours) experience little change in opportunity  (fig. 5.10~).  The 
many tax brackets are clearly evident by  the  large number of  jumps of  the 
marginal implicit tax function. Jumps in the marginal implicit tax function at 
low hours  of  work  are the result  of  the  tax  bracket  and  reductions  of  the 
income-dependent housing allowances. These generate a nonconvex budget set 
for some hours of work, as does the increased general deduction on mid-level 
incomes in 1991. (A nonconvex budget set appears for hours between fifteen 
and seventeen hundred for low-wage workers in  198  1  .) The shape of the im- 
plicit marginal tax level is similar across wage levels. The basic difference is 
that it is compressed over fewer hours of work at higher wage levels as the 
22. If  the social insurance programs were actuarially fair and the present value of  taxes paid 
over the life cycle equaled the present value of benefits received, then the social insurance system 
would be neutral. 0'-  1  .  ,  1  ,  .  I 
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income guarantees of  the benefit programs and the tax brackets are reached 
with fewer hours of work. That is, low-wage individuals face the same pattern 
of marginal tax rate changes with jump points, in terms of annual hours, spaced 
farther apart. Another key feature is that implicit marginal tax rates are lower 
for most hours of work for all wage groups in 1991 compared to 1981. Only 
low-wage earners working less than full-time in 198  1 face a lower implicit tax 
on their work effort in 1981 than in 1991. Even then, the higher implicit mar- 
ginal tax rate is due to the recovery of the more generous housing allowances 
in 1991; direct tax rates are lower in 1991 than in 1981. 
Married Man 
Figures 5.12 and 5.13 present the budget set and implicit marginal tax rates 
for a married man earning the manufacturing wage with no children and a wife 
with varying levels of labor market earnings. In both figures, panel a assumes 
that the wife does not work; panel b assumes that the wife works part-time 
(one thousand hours) at a low-wage job (half the manufacturing wage); panel 
c assumes that the wife works part-time at the manufacturing wage; panel d 
assumes that she works full-time at the manufacturing wage; and panel e as- 
sumes that she works full-time in a high-wage job (twice the manufacturing 
wage). 
The large gain from the 199  1 tax reform for high-wage individuals is appar- 
ent in all panels of figure 5.12. Men married to wives with no or low earnings 
face nearly the same budget set in 1991 as in 1981 for low hours of work (say 
fewer than one thousand hours). For hours of work chosen by most males (fif- 
teen hundred to two thousand), the tax reform of 1991 substantially increases 
their consumption set. A household with both adults working full-time at an 
average wage will experience roughly  a 20 percent increase in after-tax and 
after-program income. Gains are smaller for households with lower levels of 
labor market earnings. 
Figure 5.13 presents implicit marginal tax rates corresponding to the budget 
sets in figure 5.12. Because the individual, not the household, is the basic tax 
unit of the Swedish tax system, a married man’s marginal tax rate is indepen- 
dent of the household structure. Housing allowances depend on household in- 
come, so his implicit marginal tax rate is dependent on his partner’s labor mar- 
ket activity. The effect of interdependence is concentrated in low annual hours 
of  work for the male, and the range of  affected hours increases as spouse’s 
earnings decrease. For example, once the spouse works full-time at the manu- 
facturing wage or at a higher wage rate, the household is no longer eligible to 
receive housing allowances, and the male’s implicit marginal tax schedule is 
independent of his wife’s earnings. Indeed, across all alternative earning levels 
for the wife, males working  1,250 hours face the same implicit marginal tax 
schedule appropriate for that year. For men working more than 1,250 hours, 
the  1991 tax reform reduced their implicit marginal tax rates by as much as 
20-25  percent. B  200 
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tax rate nonworking wife (mtr-1l.wpg).  b, Implicit marginal tax rate wife works 
part-time at low wage (mtr-9.wpg).  c, Implicit marginal tax rate wife works part- 
time at mean wage (mtr-7.wpg).  d,  Implicit marginal tax rate wife works full- 
time at mean wage (mtr-6.wpg).  e,  Implicit marginal tax rate wife works 
full-time at high wage (mtr-1O.wpg). 
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Woman with Two School-Age Children 
Figures 5.14 and 5.15 present the budget set and implicit marginal tax rates 
for a woman earning the manufacturing wage and living in a household with 
two  school-aged children.  In panel  a, the woman  is assumed to be  single, 
while, in the remaining panels, she has a partner assumed to be working full- 
time. In panel b, the partner works in a low-wage job; in panel c, the partner 
works in an average-wage position; and, in panel d, the partner works in a high- 
wage job. With (school-aged) children present, the budget sets in figure 5.14 
incorporate the (nontaxed) child allowances, measured in  199  1 kronor; these 
amount of  SKr  11,314 in  1981 and SKr 18,000 in  1991 and account for a 
large part of the improvement of the budget set for the single-parent household 
(panel a). 
Nonconvexities in the budget sets are also apparent, although many are out- 
side the usual levels of annual hours of work. For unmarried women, one non- 
convex portion occurs between twenty-three hundred and three thousand hours 
in 198  1. However, nonconvexities resulting from the additional general deduc- 
tion affect households at low hours of work, for example, in the neighborhood 
of five to eight hundred hours. Finally, as for previous households, the largest 
gains accrue to households with the largest labor market income. 
Figure 5.15 presents implicit marginal tax rates corresponding to the budget 
sets in figure 5.14. Somewhat surprisingly, only for women married to the aver- 
age wage earner is there a significant range of  hours of  work for which  the 
implicit marginal tax rate is higher in 1991 than in 1981. Even then, this range 
is confined to a region of low hours of work (two to eight hundred hours). In 
this range, each hour of work by the woman reduces the household’s housing 
allowance. The loss of housing allowances is partially offset by the additional 
general  deduction, which is exhausted  at  1,250 hours of  work. From  1,250 
hours, the implicit marginal tax rate equals the marginal tax rate. For all other 
groups, and for all other hours of work, implicit marginal tax rates are lower 
in 1991 than in 1981. 
5.5.2  Trends in Participation and Hours of Work 
Since 1980, labor force participation  rates by young men and women have 
been similar, in terms of both level and time-series pattern  (see app. B). The 
recent economic problems have been particularly marked for the youngest age 
group; their participation rates have dropped by approximately 20 percent (1  1 
percentage points) in the last three years. For the other two age groups, gender 
differences in participation rates have narrowed, yet the time-series profiles are 
quite different across gender. Among prime-age workers (aged twenty-five to 
fifty-four), female labor force participation rates rose sharply, increasing 35 
percentage points in twenty-five years. Since 1985, labor force participation 
rates for both men and women of this age group have generally exceeded 90 
percent. While female participation rates rose rapidly, labor force participation 237  The Effects of Sweden’s Welfare State on Labor Supply Incentives 
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Fig. 5.14  Budget set for a woman with two children. a, Budget set single 
woman (bs-12.wpg). 6,  Budget set husband works full-time at low wage 
(bsJ3.wpg).  c, Budget set husband works full-time at mean wage (bs-14.wpg). 
d, Budget set husband works full-time at high wage (bs-15.wpg). 
rates for prime-age males remained within a narrow band around 95 percent. 
For the oldest age group of workers (aged fifty-five to sixty-four), male partici- 
pation rates have steadily fallen from the mid-l960s, and female rates have 
steadily increased. By 1992, men near retirement have labor force participation 
rates only 5 percentage points greater than comparably aged women (72 vs. 
67 percent). 
Time-series patterns in average weekly hours of work exhibit a similar U 
shape. Weekly hours of  work declined from the early  1960s until the early 
1980s; then weekly hours increase during the  1980s and level off or slightly 
decline in the 1990s. Increases in hours of work during the 1980s were stronger 
for women than for men and for prime-age workers than for older workers. 
While the time-series profiles are similar, women consistently work six to eight 238  Thomas Aronsson and James R. Walker 
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fewer hours per week than do men. Only among the youngest age group has 
the gender gap in hours increased, and even for this group the increase is mod- 
est and has been stable since the mid-1970s. 
The large number of legislative changes to Sweden’s social insurance pro- 
grams and tax system during the last thirty years makes it nearly impossible to 
use aggregate time-series data to identify the behavioral responses to any single 
policy. Even if the policy environment were stable, the irregularities  of  the 
budget set confronting Swedish consumers vitiates any attempt to glean behav- 
ioral responses from the aggregate time-series data. Consequently, we do not 
attempt to do so and make only one broad observation. The large increase in 
female wages generated by the “solidarity” wage policy initiated in the early 
1960s, the adoption of the individual as the unit of  taxation (which lowered 239  The Effects of Sweden’s Welfare State on Labor Supply Incentives 
the marginal tax rate facing Swedish women), and the increasing marginal tax 
rates that occurred during most of this period and gave strong incentives to 
equalize taxable income among household members all contributed to the im- 
pressive increase in labor force participation  by Swedish women. Obtaining 
more precise estimates of the effect of the Swedish welfare state on labor sup- 
ply requires a review of the microeconometric evidence. 
5.5.3  Econometric Evidence 
In this section, we review the empirical labor supply literature to assess the 
incentive effects of  Sweden’s tax and cash benefits on labor supply. Several 
recent surveys address similar issues.23  We concentrate on studies of Swedish 
behavior and augment this literature only as needed. We review the empirical 
literature on taxes and labor supply first and then discuss estimates of the wel- 
fare costs. 
Labor Supply Elasticities 
The canonical  model presented in section 5.2 has been the workhorse in 
estimating labor supply elasticities. To a greater or lesser extent, researchers 
have invoked its structure in an attempt to recover the holy trinity  of  labor 
supply studies-the  uncompensated wage elasticity, the income elasticity, and 
the  compensated  wage  elasticity.  The canonical  model’s  simple theoretical 
structure does not translate into a simple econometric model. Even more sur- 
prising, the consensus model of labor supply does not lead to consensus esti- 
mates of the labor supply elasticities. The range of labor supply elasticities is 
large, especially considering the amount of resources devoted to the task. The 
lack of consensus has led to a proliferation of studies, each making one or two 
extensions to the canonical model of participation and hours of work. To labor 
supply analysts, the question seems to be how to tweak the canonical model to 
improve its fit. To most outside observers, the question frequently is, “Why did 
you expect the canonical model to fit in the first place?” Yet, as we now discuss, 
knowledge about labor supply behavior has accumulated. 
Studies of male labor supply are most prevalent because the high participa- 
tion rates of males permit simpler econometric procedures. Table 5.2 presents 
estimates of  the labor supply elasticities for men from recent  studies using 
Swedish data. All the papers represented therein explicitly consider Sweden’s 
tax and benefit system. The studies differ in their specification of the budget 
constraint facing  the  male  worker-as  either  convex or nonconvex  and as 
smooth or “kinked,” the latter usually characterized by piecewise linear seg- 
ments. The studies also make different assumptions about the source of distur- 
23. Pencavel (1986) reviews studies of male labor supply, while Killingsworth and Heckman 
(1986) survey the literature on female labor supply. Both are wide-ranging surveys that discuss 
taxes and labor supply as one (small) portion of their papers. Kdlingsworth (1983) offers a com- 
prehensive review of  both literatures. Hausman (1985) concentrates on the public finance aspects 
of labor supply. Atkinson (1987) reviews the incentive effects of social insurance programs. 240  Thomas Aronsson and James R. Walker 
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Linear Is.,  convex b.c. 
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Note: LNU = Level of Living Survey; HUS = Swedish Household Market and Nonmarket Activi- 
ties Survey; 1,s. = labor supply; b.c. = budget constraint; IV = instrumental variables. 
bances (e.g., are hours of work measured with error? are consumer preferences 
fixed or allowed to have unobserved differences across members of the popula- 
tion [random preferences]?). For all these important econometric differences, 
with the exception of the last row of the table, all the uncompensated  wage 
elasticities are positive but small. For this dimension, an increase in the wage 
generates a small but positive increase in hours of work. The range of the un- 
compensated wage elasticities is similar to Hausman’s (1985) summary of esti- 
mates obtained from studies incorporating explicit controls of the U.S. tax and 
benefit system and is higher than Pencavel’s (1986) estimated range of  from 
-.17  to 0, with a mean of -.12, from his comprehensive review of labor sup- 
ply  studies. In part, the positive  uncompensated  wage effect may be due to 
the restriction to prime-age males aged twenty-five to fifty-five by the studies 
reported in table 5.2. It is unlikely  to be due to the reliance on linear labor 
supply functions and its monotonic effect of wages on labor supply. Two stud- 
ies permitting more flexible functional forms also report positive uncompen- 
sated wage effects. The estimated income elasticities also show a narrow range 
and a small effect. Unlike studies of U.S. and British data, the estimated in- 
come elasticities are quite small and precisely estimated. Increased nonlabor 241  The Effects of Sweden’s Welfare State on Labor Supply Incentives 
Table 5.3  Female Labor Supply Elasticities 
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Note; The first three studies use Swedish data, the studies by  Blundell and his coauthors analyze 
British data, and the last two studies use US.  data. Also, 1,s. = labor supply; b.c. = budget con- 
straint; FIML = full information maximum likelihood. 
income has a negative but small effect on hours worked. The small uncompen- 
sated wage elasticity and small negative income elasticity yield a positive, al- 
though again small, compensated wage effect of  around .lo, near Pencavel’s 
point estimate of the compensated wage effect of  .12. The main implication 
from the estimates in table 5.2 is that men’s hours of work are not very respon- 
sive to changes in wages and nonlabor income. The estimates show that moder- 
ate changes in the marginal tax rate will not induce a large labor supply re- 
sponse by  men. However, for nonconvex sections of  the budget, small wage 
changes may induce large changes in hours of work. 
Table 5.3 reports estimates of  female labor supply elasticities. Even from 
these two studies using  Swedish data and explicitly incorporating taxes, the 
range of  estimates of  female labor supply elasticities is larger than for men. 
Uncompensated wage elasticities are positive and several times larger than for 
males. The greater responsiveness of women’s labor supply to changes in wages 
is repeatedly found in nearly all empirical analyses. Given the large increase 
in female labor force participation rates in Sweden and elsewhere, it would be 
surprising to estimate negative uncompensated  wage elasticities for women. 242  Thomas Aronsson and James R. Walker 
Reviewing the income elasticities reported in table 5.3, estimated income elas- 
ticities are small, while the compensated wage elasticities are large, near 0.8, 
several times larger than the comparable value for males. 
The middle two entries in table 5.3 are commonly cited studies using U.S. 
data. These studies are included in the table to exhibit the wide range of  esti- 
mated elasticities in the literature. Notice that, from just two studies using com- 
parable procedures and comparable data, the uncompensated elasticity varies 
by a factor of more than two, the income elasticity by a factor of ten, and the 
compensated elasticity by a factor of four. 
The paper by Blundell, Duncan,  and Meghir (1993) reports labor supply 
elasticities for married women in Britain. The British study also incorporates 
explicit controls for taxes and benefits using a more robust estimation proce- 
dure of the labor supply function. Including this additional study increases the 
range of estimates for uncompensated wage effect but adds little to the range 
of the income elasticity or the compensated elasticity. From these estimates, it 
is clear that women’s labor supply behavior is more responsive than men’s to 
changes in wages and incomes, although the range of estimates remains un- 
comfortably large. 
Welfare Effects of Taxes and Benefits 
Estimates of the excess burden are commonly used to measure the welfare 
costs of taxes and benefits. Table 5.4 reports several estimates obtained from 
Swedish data. The first three studies in the table consider only the effect of 
income taxes-that  is, they replace only the income tax with a lump-sum tax 
while leaving other taxes in place. The estimates measure the excess burden as 
a percentage of the income tax revenue. As expected under Sweden’s progres- 
sive tax system, the loss increases as one moves up the income distribution. 
Also, as expected in the light of recent reforms, the welfare costs of the income 
tax appear to have decreased considerably during the last decade.24  As a com- 
parison, we also include the results reported by  Hausman (1981), which are 
based on data for the United States from 1975 and refer to the excess burden 
of the federal tax in a model of male labor supply. Notice that Hausman’s esti- 
mate of the excess burden for the United States is smaller than most of excess 
burdens reported in table 5.4, reflecting Sweden’s high marginal tax rates. 
The results suggest that the excess burden in the prereform system may have 
been con~iderable.~~  Considering the magnitude of indirect taxes in Sweden, 
24. The qualitative conclusion of a large reduction in the excess burden from the 1991 income 
tax reform is also supported by  the results in a recent paper by  Aarberge, Dagsvik, and Strom 
(1993). 
25. The large excess burdens reported by Aronsson and Palme (1994) are similar to those re- 
ported by  Hansson (1984). Hansson applies a general equilibrium model to  data from 1979 and 
computes the marginal cost of public funds, which measures the change in the excess burden from 
additional tax revenues and depends on how these additional tax  revenues are spent. Hansson 
reports some huge excess burdens (214-620 percent) from the taxation of labor. With an assumed 
elasticity of substitution between labor and capital of 0.79-0.96  and a postulated savings function, 243  The Effects of Sweden’s Welfare State on Labor Supply Incentives 
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an obvious weakness of these studies is their narrow focus on the excess burden 
of income taxes. Aronsson and Palme (1994) incorporate the VAT and examine 
the labor supply and welfare effects of the sequence of tax and benefit reforms 
in Sweden during the last decade. The bottom portion of table 5.4 reports their 
estimates of the excess burden (defined as a percentage of the net tax payment, 
where the latter is measured as the sum of payments of income taxes and value 
added tax less transfer payments received). When indirect taxes are incorpo- 
rated, their results indicate that much higher excess burdens occur. The relative 
nearly all the inefficiency of  the taxation of  labor in Hansson’s estimates operates through the 
capital market. When the capital stock is assumed fixed (so there is no substitution between labor 
and capital), as in the partial equilibrium framework of the labor supply studies, Hansson’s measure 
of  the excess burden declines (to a first approximation) to 16 percent. Hansson’s paper cautions 
against the narrow focus of the labor supply studies and an overemphasis on excess burden levels. 
Rather, relative comparisons (within a given parametric model) of the excess burden of alternative 
reforms are informative, not the absolute level of any excess burden. Thus, the microeconometric 
estimates of the excess burden from the labor supply studies give important insights into the distri- 
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ranking of estimated excess burdens across population groups and across tax 
reforms is similar to the earlier studies. They also find, in agreement with the 
regressive nature of consumption taxes, that the distribution of disposable in- 
come is more unequal in the 1991 regime than in the 1980 and 1989 regimes. 
Summary 
Although there remain serious econometric issues (see app. C) in the ex- 
isting labor supply studies, we believe that this work reveals some important 
insights, which deserve to be summarized. First, the labor supply behavior of 
women appears to be more sensitive to changes in marginal wage rates and 
virtual nonlabor income than that of  men. Second, the labor supply response 
(as measured by hours of work) to tax reform is likely to be relatively moder- 
ate, primarily because of  the inelastic labor supply functions. For example, 
Aronsson  and Palme  (1994) predict  that the  average labor supply increase 
among prime-aged individuals following the  1991 tax and benefit reform is 
about one hundred hours per year for men and even smaller for women (by 
comparing the predicted behavior under the 1989 tax and benefit system with 
the predicted behavior under the 1991 system). Third, the welfare loss associ- 
ated with the prereform tax system may have been considerable. Hence, even 
in  the light of  small labor supply elasticities, the high marginal income tax 
rates produce a large excess burden. The tax and benefit reform of  1991 ap- 
pears have led to a large reduction of these welfare losses. 
5.5.4  Evidence on the Effect of Sickness Benefits and Pensions 
We consider next the effect of programs commonly perceived to have in- 
duced strong disincentives to work-the  sickness insurance cash benefit and 
the pension system. 
The Sickness Insurance System 
Figure 5.16 presents the unemployment rate for individuals aged sixteen to 
sixty-four and the number of days per employee of sickness benefits paid (the 
left-hand vertical axis) from the initiation of the national insurance system in 
1955 until 1991. The vertical lines at 1963, 1967, 1974, and 1987 denote the 
major reforms of  the system. Several striking features appear in figure 5.16. 
Notice first that, as early as  1955, the mean number of  sick days is nearly 
twelve days per insured worker. By the end of the sample period, per capita 
usage of benefits more than doubled, reaching a peak of twenty-five days in 
1988. Even the initial usage is high, and it is important to realize that other 
reasons for excused (and usually compensated) work absences are not included 
in the sickness cash benefit. (Permanent and temporary disabilities fall within 
the pension system, while other common sources of job absences such as preg- 
nancy, childbirth, and temporary child-care benefits are in the child-care sys- 
tem and have a separate accounting.) Even by international standards, Sweden's 245  The Effects of Sweden’s Welfare State on Labor Supply Incentives 
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use of sickness benefits is high. Henrekson, Lantto, and Persson (1992) report 
that only Denmark’s use of sickness benefits is close to Sweden’s.26 
Taken at face value, the increased usage of  sickness cash benefits implies 
increased morbidity within the Swedish population, a conclusion at odds with 
its fine public health record. However, the timing of increased usage coincides 
with program reforms improving the generosity of the system. Noticeable in- 
creases in usage occurred in 1963, 1967, 1974, and 1987. The most persuasive 
evidence that increased usage of cash benefits does not reflect the health status 
of the population comes from a comparison with usage rates over the business 
cycle. Until the three-day coinsurance period was removed in 1967, there was 
no relation between sickness days and the cycle. However, since 1967, usage 
of  sickness cash benefits has been  strongly procyclic (the simple correlation 
between unemployment  and sickness days is -0.7).  It appears that sickness 
benefits are used to smooth hours of work. When demand for labor is high 
(unemployment is low), sick days increase; when demand for labor is low and 
unemployment is relatively high, the use of sick days is low. This is exactly the 
pattern that would emerge if workers use sickness benefits to intertemporally 
smooth their consumption stream. 
Additional evidence on the  disincentive  effects of  sickness cash benefits 
26. International comparisons are always difficult; however, from the information reported in 
Henrekson, Lantto, and Persson (1992), sickness insurance systems in Denmark and Sweden ap- 
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comes from a cross-sectional study by Bjorklund (1991). Bjorklund analyzes 
the determinants of  paid days of sickness benefits. He separates usage for a 
twelve-month period into two categories: accumulated days of sickness bene- 
fits from all short spells and accumulated days of  sickness benefits from all 
long spells. Short spells are seven or fewer days, absences for which no medi- 
cal certificate  is required, while  all  longer  absences  are classified as  long 
spells. He regresses these variables on characteristics of the worker and the job. 
Bjorklund finds that, for both long and short spells, workers on jobs requiring 
monotonous work make greater use of sickness benefits. Also, usage of sick- 
ness benefits differs significantly by  age. Young workers take more days of 
sickness benefits in short absences, while older workers are more likely to 
take their sickness benefits in long spells. These age patterns follow morbidity 
patterns and suggest that young people’s usage of sickness benefits is less re- 
lated to medical need than to work preferences. 
In order to reduce these apparent work disincentives, the sickness cash bene- 
fit system was subject to reforms in both 1991 and 1993. As was explained in 
subsection 5.4.2 above, these reforms were designed primarily to reduce the 
generosity of benefits corresponding to shorter spells of illness. The influence 
of  the  1991 reform is discussed  in  a recent  paper by  Johansson  and Palme 
(1993). Using panel data for the period 1981-84,  Johansson and Palme esti- 
mate a model of worker absenteeism where the decision to be absent from 
work is closely related to (or part of) the labor supply decision. As the influ- 
ence of the sickness benefit is taken into account in the estimation, the esti- 
mated model provides a natural framework for the simulation of reforms. The 
simulation conducted by the authors is to compare the predicted and observed 
behavior in 1990 and 1991. As the experiment turned out, the average number 
of sick days was predicted to fall by 4.45 percent (an underprediction of the 
actual reduction, which was 6.25 percent). About 79 percent of the predicted 
change in sick days can be attributed to the 1991 reform of the sickness benefit 
system, while the rest can be attributed to the change in the unemployment rate 
(which was higher in 1991 than it was in 1990). A natural conclusion is, there- 
fore, that recent reforms of the sickness benefit system appear to have reduced 
work disincentives. 
The EfSect of Publicly Provided Pensions on Labor Supply 
The labor force participation  of men nearing retirement age (fifty-five to 
sixty-four) declined from 90 to 75 percent during the thirty years spanned by 
the AKU (Arbetskraftsundersokningen)  surveys. This large decline in labor 
force attachment is frequently attributed to the increased generosity of the pub- 
lic pension system. The vast (and growing) literature on the labor supply incen- 
tives of old-age security programs implies that this reasoning is far too simple. 
In his encyclopedic review of  the literature, Atkinson (1987) describes a de- 
pressingly wide range of findings regarding the incentive effects on labor sup- 
ply. Although no study has found that increased social security benefits lead to 247  The Effects of Sweden’s Welfare State on Labor Supply Incentives 
a large increase in labor supply, studies are evenly divided between finding 
moderate to large negative effects and no or negligible positive effects. While 
informative on the algebraic sign of  the effect, the literature again provides 
little guidance on magnitudes. 
The inherent complexity of the retirement problem contributes to the con- 
flicting findings in the literature. The retirement decision is fundamentally an 
intertemporal decision and requires a dynamic model. Also, modeling the re- 
tirement decision highlights the many different dimensions of  labor supply. 
The most frequently analyzed dimension is the dichotomous participation de- 
cision-whether  to continue working or to retire. Yet  programs such as the 
partial pension that subsidize reductions in hours of work before full departure 
from the labor market encourage the analysis of hours worked in addition to 
the participation decision. The work-conditioned benefit schemes of the sup- 
plementary pension system (ATP) generate entitlement effects that may induce 
workers to increase their labor supply in the periods prior to retirement. Thus, 
total  hours  of  work  over  the  life  cycle  may  increase.  Indeed,  Hansson- 
Brusewitz (1992) finds a positive effect on total labor supply from the partial 
pension system and the earnings replacement rates of the supplementary old- 
age pension. 
Several studies exist of the effect of disability pensions on labor supply in- 
centives. Evidence of disincentive effects emerges more frequently than in the 
retirement literature, but again the range of estimated effects is depressingly 
large (Atkinson 1987). Consideration of Sweden’s situation suggests a negative 
effect on participation. Administered  exactly like the old-age pension, cash 
benefits for a disability pension rise as benefits for the basic and supplemental 
pensions rise. The major revision in the disability program was the incorpora- 
tion of nonhealth considerations in awarding disability pensions to those near 
retirement. Direct evidence is not available, but several time-series trends sug- 
gest a negative incentive effect on labor force participation. First, the number 
of  new disability pensions has risen seven times faster than the population 
eligible to receive a disability pension. From  1971 to  1988, the population 
aged eighteen to sixty-four increased 6 percent. The number of new disability 
pensions over the same period increased 42 percent. Roughly  15 percent of 
new awards are temporary disability pensions, a share that has been stable over 
time, which means that the fraction of the population on disability pensions 
increased dramatically during the last twenty years. Adding to the public bur- 
den, the age composition of disability pensions has slightly shifted to younger 
ages. In 1971,44 percent of the new disability pensions were awarded to indi- 
viduals sixty to sixty-four years old. In 1988 (the last year of data), that fraction 
had declined to 38 percent. Moreover, an increased willingness to award labor 
market disabilities to older workers is apparent from the data. In  1977, 3.6 
percent of all new pensions were due to labor market disab 
1980s, as the number of  new disability pensions increased, a remarkable 20 
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since  1972, older workers  may  receive a  disability  pension  rather  than be 
forced to change location or occupation). By the late 1980s, the share of labor 
market pensions had declined to 10-1 1 percent. Among those receiving a labor 
market pension, the age composition of recipients of labor market pensions 
has tended toward younger workers among the sixty to sixty-four age group. 
The insurance board is more willing to extend labor market disability pensions 
and is more willing to award them to younger workers. 
The extension of disability pensions to labor market conditions does not 
explain all the rise in disability pensions. That is, even without the labor market 
conditions provision, the share of the population covered by a disability pen- 
sion increased during the last twenty years. Sweden’s fine public health record 
means that the increased prevalence of disability pensions is not due to a less- 
healthy work environment. The rapid rise in disability pensions and its burden 
on society warrants a review of its effects on labor supply. 
5.5.5  Education and the Investment in Human Capital: The Supply of 
Skilled Labor 
In this section, we review the evidence on the incentive effects on the quality 
composition of the workforce. Uncovering effects of the tax and benefit system 
on quality or skill is difficult because it is harder to identify changes in compo- 
sitions than changes in magnitudes. Moreover, the large number of compensa- 
tion mechanisms implies that incentive effects can be spread across many mon- 
etary and nonmonetary forms. In the same vein, adjustments made through the 
underground economy will also not be observed. Hence, empirical evidence 
on this dimension is less systematic and more qualitative than the evidence 
on quantity dimensions of  labor supply. Rather than consider changes in the 
occupational distribution  (which can be due to technological advances, i.e., 
demand-side influences), we concentrate on the willingness of individuals to 
invest in human capital.27 
We first review the trends in educational attainment. Since 1960, the Swed- 
ish labor force has become more skilled as better-educated young members 
joined the workforce. From  1960 to  1986, the share of the labor force with 
twelve or more years of schooling rose from 5 percent to approximately 30 
percent.28  The growth appears to have peaked in the mid-1980s as the share of 
the workforce with college degrees has remained constant. 
Such economywide measures as the educational attainment of the workforce 
respond at the slow rate of demographic change; to move the aggregate mea- 
sure requires that new entrants have much higher educational attainments than 
retiring older members. A review of enrollment rates offers another perspective 
on educational process. Enrollment rates peaked in the late  1960s, declined 
during the 1970s, and then increased steadily during the 1980s. Until the early 
27. For a complementary review of this literature, see Edin and Topel (chap. 4  in this volume). 
28. A review of  other education levels (e.g., postsecondary schooling) yields similar patterns. 249  The Effects of Sweden’s Welfare State on Labor Supply Incentives 
197Os, men were more likely to remain in school during their early twenties 
than were women. Since then, women are more likely to remain in school. The 
rates also exhibit a strong cyclic pattern, rising during the 1977-78  recession 
and again during the stagnant years of the early 1980s; they fall slightly in the 
mid- 1980s and then rise again strongly during the recent economic slowdown. 
Indeed, Edin and Holmlund (1993) document that the relative supply of skilled 
workers  closely  corresponds  to movements  in  the  wage premia  to college- 
trained  workers.  However,  while  this  is  evidence  of  the  validity  of 
a neoclassical model of  the labor market, it is hard to discern direct supply 
effects. 
Most interesting from our point of view is an analysis of the return to educa- 
tion incorporating the effects of the tax and transfer system. With both subsid- 
ies and taxes, no theoretical predictions were forthcoming on the incentives to 
invest in education (see app. A). Estimates by Edin and Holmund (1993) show 
that the progressive tax system (and probably wage solidarity) had the effect 
of depressing the return to education. According to their estimates, in 1968 the 
internal rate of return to higher education for a male worker was 11.9 percent. 
By 1974, the rate had fallen to 3.6, and it fell again to a minuscule 0.5 percent 
in  1981! Hence, it is not surprising that the share of college graduates in the 
workforce remained constant since the mid-1980s. Since its trough in  1981, 
the internal rate of  return  increased slowly during the  1980s. By  1991, the 
estimated return was still below its 1968 level but above its 1974 value. Includ- 
ing the loans and subsidies, the estimated return for 1991 about doubled, and 
it appears that educational subsidies have a larger effect than does the income 
tax system. 
While no strong evidence appears on educational attainment decision, weak 
evidence suggests that the tax and transfer system (a)  distorted the incentives 
and (b)  may have reduced the incentive to receive education. Other factors did 
not remain constant during the period (e.g., macroeconomic  conditions and 
government training programs, although the latter is probably not relevant for 
this group), making it impossible to make strong statements on this issue. 
5.5.6 
The high marginal tax rates (statutory and implicit) make honesty expensive 
in Sweden. Did Swedes continue to comply with the legislated tax burdens as 
marginal rates increased dramatically during the  1970s and early 1980s? Or 
did Swedes begin to free ride and reduce their burden by underreporting their 
taxable income? No convincing evidence exists to answer this important ques- 
tion. The little evidence that exists does not suggest rampant tax evasion or 
other fraudulent behavior. Studies of taxpayers from the United States reveal 
high rates of compliance (although at marginal tax rates far below Sweden’s). 
A few surveys attempt to gauge individual perceptions of the fairness of the 
Swedish tax system (Vogel 1974; Wiirneryd and Walerud 1982). These studies 
show only a slight increase in the perceived unfairness of the tax system. Pub- 
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lic opinion polls report that support for Sweden’s social insurance programs is 
high and that strong sentiments continue against inflating deductions or under- 
reporting taxable income. The continued broadening of the definition of tax- 
able income suggests that public decision makers are not unaware of  these 
issues. 
While there is little evidence of tax evasion, there is evidence of tax avoid- 
ance. Feldstein (1993) notes, for example, that there is substantial sensitivity 
of  deductions for mortgage interest and charitable contributions to marginal 
tax rates. This redirection of expenditures in response to the high marginal tax 
rates creates additional deadweight losses that are conceptually different from 
the conventional measures of excess burden. Changes in the marginal tax rate 
can induce changes in labor supply and may also induce changes in the struc- 
ture of taxable income. The occupational choice model implies that high mar- 
ginal tax rates encourage individuals and firms to structure employee compen- 
sation  in  untaxed  or  effectively  low-tax  forms.  Examples  of  nontaxed 
compensation include first-class travel, use of a corporate automobile, and in- 
house sports facilities. Forms of compensation that are taxed at effectively low 
rates include deferred compensation plans, life insurance, and stock options. 
High-income and wealthy individuals also have the income flow from assets, 
capital income, to supplement labor market earnings. Difference in income tax 
rates on earned and capital income create additional incentives to structure 
asset portfolios to minimize tax liability (holding constant risk exposure of a 
portfolio). Preferential tax treatment of capital gains provides an additional 
incentive to time the realization of capital gains to the individual’s advantage. 
A review of the effects of taxation on the incentives to save and the portfolio 
effects is beyond the scope of  this review.29  The magnitude of these effects, 
and particularly the sensitivity of  taxable income to changes in marginal tax 
rates, is unresolved. Feldstein (1993) finds that elasticity of  taxable income 
with respect to a change in marginal tax rates is at least one and may be higher. 
Yet  neither Scholz (1993) nor Slemrod (1992), analyzing the last major tax 
reform in the United States (the Tax Reform Act of  1986), find evidence of 
portfolio effects. Using a different approach and different data, Triest (1992) 
finds some support for the endogeneity of deductions. That a central aspect of 
the 1991 income tax reform in Sweden was to simplify and unify the treatment 
of capital income suggests that these are nontrivial issues. 
It is easy to miss the provocative implications that these studies have for the 
analysis of taxes and labor supply. One way to organize these findings is to 
distinguish between the effect of taxes on real dimensions (e.g., labor supply, 
savings, and portfolio risk exposure) and the effect of taxes on the recognition 
and reporting of income. Feldstein (1993), Slemrod (1992), and Scholz (1993) 
suggest that taxes affect reported taxable income but have little direct effect on 
behavior generating that income. The minimal behavior effect of taxes esti- 
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mated in the labor supply literature and summarized in the preceding sections 
is consistent with this interpretation. 
Moreover, the responsiveness of reported taxable income to a change in the 
structure of taxes has important policy implications. Knowledge of the respon- 
siveness is absolutely central for predicting the expected revenue gain (or loss) 
from a change in the structure of taxes. As Feldstein (1993) points out, because 
there is so much flexibility in the recognition of income, naive predictions of 
revenue gains from an increase in tax rates that do not recognize these opportu- 
nities may overstate actual revenue gains. Forecasting errors is one cost, but a 
far larger cost is that tax avoidance activities require real resources. Tax plan- 
ners, tax accountants, and tax lawyers engaged in tax avoidance all represent a 
reallocation of resources and an inefficiency that is in addition to the excess 
burden calculations presented earlier. 
The responsiveness of labor supply, savings, and financial portfolio compo- 
sition are all outcomes of complicated, multidimensional choice processes. It 
is not surprising that they show little responsiveness to taxes in the short run 
because tax consequences  are only one of  many  aspects of the decision. In 
terms of labor supply, most individuals cannot offer an indivisible unit of labor 
supply  as posited  in  the canonical  labor-leisure  model.  Rather, changes in 
hours occur through entry and exit decisions or, as the evidence from Bjor- 
klund (1991) suggests, through  adjustments made via days of sickness ben- 
efit~.~~ 
5.6  Summary 
The income tax and every social insurance program affect the budget sets 
of consumers and consequently their incentive to work. The influence of taxes 
and transfer programs on labor force participation and hours of work has been 
the  subject of  extensive research  during  the last twenty  years. Answers  are 
elusive, and measuring the labor supply effects, the efficiency costs, and the 
distributional consequences of these government interventions remains an ac- 
tive and challenging area of economic and policy research. 
From the extensive research, several observations emerge for the Swedish 
context. We  take  labor  force  participation  first.  Because benefit  levels  are 
closely  related  to earnings,  the  structure  of  social  insurance  benefits  gives 
strong incentives for all  individuals (men and women) to participate  in the 
30. Studies by  Feldstein (1993) and others imply that the real limitation of the existing labor 
supply studies is their reliance on a two-good (static) model. Triest’s (1992) results on the endogen- 
eity of deductions imply that a three-good model is required to capture the differences between 
deductible and nondeductible consumption expenditures. The three-good model would be an im- 
portant first step toward capturing some of the responsiveness found by Feldstein (1993) and oth- 
ers. Since housing expenditures are a significant expenditure for most households, and because 
housing has been and is heavily subsidized through the deductibility of mortgage interest, a natural 
first investigation along these lines would be to analyze the joint determination of labor supply, 
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labor market. Moreover, individual taxation and high marginal tax rates pro- 
vide strong incentives to equalize labor earnings between household partners. 
Econometric studies applying the canonical model to Swedish data confirm 
that female labor supply is more elastic than male, with most of the response 
at the extensive margin of  labor for participation and not via hours of  work 
(among those already working). 
The response in the hours of work to tax and benefit reforms among those 
who are already participating appears to be of less importance. Although esti- 
mation procedures vary considerably across studies, a common finding of the 
econometric studies of male labor supply behavior is that the estimated com- 
pensated wage elasticity is small. However, even in the presence of low com- 
pensated labor supply elasticities, the high marginal tax rates of the 1970s and 
1980s produced large welfare costs. 
Our broad perspective on labor supply recognizes that hours of work is only 
one dimension of labor supply and that sole concentration on it will miss re- 
sponses in other dimensions. As observed hours of work is the outcome of both 
supply and demand factors, hours of work may exhibit little responsiveness to 
changes in taxes because  demand-side factors (e.g.,  coordination activities) 
may impose quantity restrictions on the structure of the work week that will 
limit the flexibility of workers to change their hours of work in the short run. 
Indeed, Bjorklund’s evidence of the strong cyclic use of sickness benefits re- 
veals that work disincentives are present and cautions against the belief that 
high marginal tax rates or subsidies have weak labor supply effects because 
few have been recovered from labor supply functions estimated from hours of 
work data. Similarly, Edin and Holmlund’s finding that the share of students is 
sensitive to the return  to higher education provides  initial evidence that the 
quality dimensions (e.g., skill) of labor supply are also important. 
These studies suggest that responses to changes in tax and program incen- 
tives occur in labor supply dimensions that are hard to measure and that conse- 
quently have received less attention in the economics literature. High marginal 
tax rates give consumers strong incentives to change the structure of compen- 
sation away from monetary sources, to work in the underground economy, and 
to misreport taxable income. Almost by definition,  the latter two responses 
defy measurement. The large number of  potential dimensions over which to 
define compensation (both in terms of fringe benefits and in terms of the timing 
of compensation) also serves to severely complicate the measurement problem. 
Moreover, the  intertemporal nature of many of these  decisions implies that 
there may be a long lag between policy change and behavioral response. The 
complexity of the measurement issue means that clear, conclusive evidence on 
the disincentive  effects in these dimensions  does not exist.31 The challenge 
31. Other authors have noted the wide range of labor supply elasticities and the resulting lack 
of consensus about the magnitude of  disincentive effects (Atkinson 1993; Gustafsson and Klev- 
marken 1993). Perhaps not surprising, most of the controversy centers on the magnitude of more 253  The Effects of Sweden’s Welfare State on Labor Supply Incentives 
for future research is to determine the magnitude of  behavioral responses in 
these dimensions. 
To guide the policy discussion, we speculate on the relative magnitudes and 
the expected effect of recent policy reforms. 
5.7  Expected Future Changes 
The 1991 income tax reform lowered marginal tax rates and broadened the 
tax base. Motivated by concern over the disincentive effects created by high 
marginal tax rates, it is the last of a sequence of reforms intended to simplify 
and unify the tax system. The best available evidence suggests that the 1991 
reform  led to a considerable reduction in  the excess burden, especially  for 
high-wage workers. The small labor supply elasticities estimated in  several 
recent studies using Swedish data imply little response in labor force participa- 
tion or hours of work. The broadening of the tax base and the more uniform 
treatment of capital income remove incentives to avoid taxation by searching 
for other forms of  compensation.  Even without  direct labor supply effects, 
these latter reforms should tighten the connection between realized  and tax- 
able income. 
As a response to the recent financial crisis, several changes have been initi- 
ated to reduce the work disincentives of the social insurance programs. A one- 
day waiting period has been introduced into the sickness insurance system, and 
benefit levels have been reduced in both the unemployment insurance and the 
sickness insurance  systems. The increased use  of  deductibles  (the one-day 
waiting period) and coinsurance (reduced compensation of earnings) will ame- 
liorate the disincentive effects of these programs. Moreover, having employers 
bear some of the program costs for the first fourteen days of absence should 
further lessen the abuses of the sickness insurance system. 
Several proposals will extend these and other reforms into other social insur- 
ance programs (e.g., Lindbeck  1993; Lindbeck et al. 1993, 1994). Increased 
use of coinsurance and deductibles is strongly advocated. Equally persuasive 
is the suggestion that the actuarial nature of insurance be introduced into health 
and pension systems. On the firm side, these reforms would introduce differen- 
tiated insurance fees for disability insurance to reflect the frequency of injury. 
For consumers, the suggestion is that both the sickness insurance and the pen- 
sion systems become actuarially based programs whereby the expected present 
value of benefits equals the expected present value of lifetime fees (Lindbeck 
subjective and speculative effects. Those most concerned about the disincentive effects stress the 
important but hard-to-measure dimensions of  labor supply, including intertemporal aspects and 
general equilibrium effects, and sometimes including broad-ranging considerations of the effect 
on family structure and the loss of personal freedom (e.g., Lindbeck 1993). Others more concerned 
about equity restrict attention to a few dimensions of choice and recognize the positive incentive 
effects (e.g., risk  sharing, consumption smoothing, work incentives of  the employment condi- 
tioned benefits) and the need to balance efficiency and equity trade-offs (e.g., Atkinson 1993). 254  Thomas Aronsson and James R. Walker 
et al. 1994, 37-38).  Development of an actuarially based social insurance sys- 
tem will require removing  those components of  the social insurance system 
that do not provide risk insurance (e.g., parental benefits and child-care bene- 
fits) but are more properly seen as transfer programs for particular subpopula- 
tions. Incorporation of these latter programs as a separate item in the govem- 
ment budget will initiate an important, and long awaited, distinction between 
insurance and transfers (Lindbeck et al. 1994, 38). 
Development of an actuarial system is required for the long-term viability 
of the social insurance systems. Maintaining pay-as-you-go  social insurance 
programs makes the system vulnerable to changes in macroeconomic condi- 
tions such as the economic downturn of 1991-93,  which has resulted in a sub- 
stantial redistribution of  income to the elderly (Lindbeck et al. 1994, 28) or 
secular demographic trends. The aging of the Swedish population  and its im- 
plications for intergenerational transfer payments are widely recognized (John- 
son 1993) and loom just beyond the horizon. Although  the consequences of 
the demographic shift will not appear until well into the next century, equity 
considerations and the importance of the long-term contractual nature of pub- 
lic pensions require immediate, although gradual, reform.32 
The reforms discussed above can be accomplished within the basic structure 
of  the current welfare state-that  is, the basic structure of  the welfare state 
will remain roughly the same as prior to these reforms. The long evolution of 
the Swedish welfare state makes it too strong to admit radical reforms in the 
short run. Democratic systems reflect the will of the people, and it is fair to say 
that Swedes have (at least approximately) the tax system and social insurance 
programs they desire. Public opinion polls reveal substantial agreement with 
the basic structure of the welfare state (Huber and Stephens 1993). It is reason- 
able to believe that the Swedish welfare state will retain its Nordic flavor and 
will  not approach the relatively  laissez-faire structure of  the United  States. 
However, although very large changes are unlikely (at least in the short run), 
it is important not to underestimate the problem of a large budget deficit, as 
well as other economic problems, facing Sweden as a small open economy. 
Seen in this light, a gradual process of  reform may reshape entitlement pro- 
grams in the years ahead. Recent reforms have reduced the disparities between 
individual and social benefits, but income tax rates in Sweden are still high 
and generate continual pressures on the Swedish welfare state. 
32. The Swedish Parliament is well aware of  these issues. In April  1994, it adopted a set of 
principles for the reform of  the public pension system. Making the system more actuarially based 
is among the set of principles adopted. 255  The Effects of Sweden’s Welfare State on Labor Supply Incentives 
Appendix A 
Occupational Choice in the Presence of  Taxes 
and Transfers 
We first explore the equilibrium in the absence of taxes and transfers. Workers 
may supply one unit of  labor to either of two occupations. Occupation 0 re- 
quires no education, while occupation 1 requires s  (exogenous and fixed) years 
of school. Once employed, individuals work in the chosen occupation forever. 
Ex ante, individuals are otherwise identical but differ in their tastes for school- 
ing. Those with the lowest values of  E have the least distaste for school. Let 
q(c)  represent the monetary value of the psychic costs of schooling for a type- 
5  individual. The cost function is such that q(0)  = 0, T’  > 0, q’’  > 0.33  The 
distribution of 6 in the population has densityfic). 
To focus on supply decisions, demand for each occupation is infinitely elas- 
tic at earnings E, in occupation j,  j = 0, 1. Hence, workers face an exogenously 
determined and constant earnings differential of A = El -  EO.  Workers enter- 
ing occupation 0 can do so immediately (time 0),  with a real interest rate I;  and 
have net wealth equal to W,,  = E&  Workers entering occupation 1 defer their 
earnings stream for the length of schooling. A type E’s gross wealth from enter- 
ing occupation 1 is W, = (E,/r)e-” and net wealth is W, -  q(6). 
An individual will acquire an education and enter the skilled occupation if 
it yields the highest net wealth, 
(-41)  W,  - *(.$)  - W,,  2  0, 
where 
The inequality condition in (Al) holds as an equality for the individual indif- 
ferent between the two occupations. That individual has index 5‘  = W1(K). 
Individuals with lower values of 6 attend school and enter the skilled occupa- 
tion. With a (fixed) population of size N, supply to the skilled occupation is 
(A2)  N”  = N  jf(z)dz = N  1  f(z)dz. 
c*  Q-’(K) 
0  0 
33. While it is important for educational policy, it is not important for this application whether 
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Now introduce a progressive income tax. Earnings in the low-education occu- 
pation are untaxed, while those in the high-education occupation are taxed at 
rate 7.  Entry into the skilled occupation is determined by modifying the deci- 
sion rule in equation (Al)  as 
The progressive tax system reduces the value of entering the skilled occupa- 
tion, and the number supplied to the occupation declines. By reducing the earn- 
ings differential between occupations, the tax system reduces the incentive for 
some individuals to acquire the skills to enter occupation 1. Notice that, unlike 
incentives  that  change  hours  or  labor  force  participation,  incentives  here 
change the composition of the labor force, not necessarily the size.34 
Progressive taxes reduce investment in human capital. It is easy to see that 
transfer programs that subsidize education or reduce its psychic cost to con- 
sumers will lead to increased investments in human capital and to an increased 
supply of skilled workers. Whether the net effect of the modern welfare state 
creates positive or negative incentives for investing in human capital is context 
specific and depends on the system of benefits and taxes. 
Reinterpret  5 as the reciprocal  of  ability and '4'  as direct educational ex- 
penses so that high-ability individuals have low values of 5 and low costs of 
acquiring the  skills to enter occupation  1. Full deductibility  of educational 
costs offsets, but does not eliminate, the reduced supply to the skilled occupa- 
ti~n.'~  The reduced supply to occupation  1 means that the average ability in- 
creases in both occupations. In a richer specification of the labor market, with 
more attention paid to the demand side, we should expect to see some response 
by firms to the higher ability levels in each occupation, perhaps by changing 
the wage rate or one or more conditions of employment. Hence, the assumption 
of an exogenous constant wage is artificial and restrictive; the tax system can 
have important effects on the demand for labor. Knowledge of both supply and 
demand effects is required to fully evaluate a tax reform. 
34. If earnings in the first occupation were also taxed, say at rate T~ < T,  and we assume that 
consumers have nonlabor income, then some individuals will choose not to work, and labor force 
participation will decline. There will still he a compositional effect, and, depending on the relative 
magnitudes of the tax rates, the fraction of the labor force employed in the unskilled sector may 
increase. Heckman (1976) shows that the deductibility of interest payments increases human capi- 
tal investments with a proportional tax system. 
35. The decision rule is K -  TW,  2 (1 -  T)*(<). Appendix B 
Tax Rates and Labor Supply Measures 
Table 5B.1  Components of the Payroll Tax for Manufacturing Workers and 
Total Payroll Tax in Manufacturing and the Civil Service, 1960-93 
Manufacturing 
Determined 
ATP  Add for Law  during  Total 














































































































































































































































42.48 Table 5B.2  Average Local Tax Rate and Value Added Tax, 1960-93 
Average Local  Value Added 
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Source: The average annual local tax rates are from Lodin (n.d.). 
Note: The VAT  is reported as a percentage of the pretax price. 
Table 5B.3  Labor Force Participation Rates by Gender and Age, 1963-92 
Males  Females 

































































































































































59.9 Table 5B.3  (continued) 
~ 
Males  Females 
Year  16-24  25-54  55-64  16-24  25-54  55-64 
1986  65.2  95.3  75.5  65.6  89.8  61.4 
1987  66.1  94.7  74.9  66.6  90.4  64.1 
1988  67.9  94.7  74.9  67.8  90.8  64.7 
1989  69.4  95.1  74.8  69.0  91.0  64.3 
1990  68.9  95.1  75.5  67.7  91.3  66.3 
1991  65.3  94.6  75.5  64.4  90.5  66.9 
1992  58.6  93.6  73.6  58.4  89.5  65.9 
Source: AKU surveys. 
Note: Since 1987, the method used by the AKU to measure unemployment and hence labor force 
participation changed slightly. 
Table 5B.4  Hours of Work per Week by Age and Gender, 1963-92 
Males  Females 
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Appendix C 
Econometric Issues Surrounding Recent Estimates of 
La  bo  r Supp  1  y 
In an area so dominated by  econometric issues, it is difficult to avoid these 
issues in our discussion of  the literature. Indeed, understanding these issues 
should also help understand the wide range of elasticities shown in tables 5.2 
and 5.3 above. 
Until the mid-l970s, the literature either neglected taxes and transfer pro- 
grams in the estimation of the labor supply function or tried to incorporate it 
using relatively simple methods. For example, a common approach was to lin- 
earize the budget constraint around the observed hours of  work-a  method 
that, in the presence of steeply progressive tax schedules, fails to recognize the 
endogeneity of the marginal wage rate (a review of this literature can be found 
in, e.g., Heckman and MaCurdy [1981]). The more recent literature, which 
represents the budget  set as a series of piecewise linear segments, arose as 
a procedure for incorporating the endogeneity of  the marginal wage rate in 
estimation. In principle, such an approach can be used to represent any budget 
constraint and can therefore be used to handle complexities such as nonlineari- 
ties and nonconvexities (e.g., poverty traps, kinks, and flats) during the estima- 
tion. The generality is more illusionary than real, however, because numerical 
problems effectively prohibit all but simple assumptions of the source of  sto- 
chastic disturbances (Heckman and MaCurdy 198  1). 
Several criticisms can be directed at the taxes and labor supply literature. 
First, until recently, labor supply analysts have put their main effort into locat- 
ing the “kinks” in the consumer’s budget set (see the special issue of the Jour- 
nal of  Human Resources, vol. 20, no. 3 [  19901).  Because of the aforementioned 
computational limitations, the focus on nonlinearities and “kinks” in the choice 
set has, to a large extent, restricted the representation of consumer preferences 
to the individual, static (and often linear) labor supply model, while richer 
behavioral specifications went unexplored. Consequently, the labor supply re- 
search became more focused on the (one-period) trade-off between consump- 
tion and leisure, as other important dimensions of the labor supply were, to a 
large extent, neglected. For example, the assumption of exogenous gross wage 
rates neglects the possibility that labor supply is part of  a decision involving 
human capital accumulation. A third line of criticism recognizes that structural 
econometric models impose restrictions on the labor supply parameters. Be- 
low, we briefly review some of this criticism and discuss its importance for the 
reliability of the results presented in previous subsections. 
Papers such as MaCurdy, Green, and Paarsch (1990) and Blundell, Duncan, 
and Meghir (1993) show that there is a relation between integrability condi- 
tions  (i.e., the Slutsky condition) and the model’s statistical coherence (the 
latter is needed to ensure meaningful probability statements). Satisfaction of 261  The Effects of Sweden’s Welfare State on Labor Supply Incentives 
the Slutsky condition is necessary for the estimated labor supply model to ful- 
fill the axioms of choice. The welfare analysis of tax reform presented above 
is valid only if the Slutsky condition is fulfilled. In the case of  labor supply 
models under piecewise linear budget constraints-once  the problem is made 
stochastic by the introduction of unobserved heterogeneity-there  is a strong 
link between integrability conditions and coherency. More precisely, statistical 
coherency requires that the model fulfill the Slutsky condition. As a conse- 
quence, the estimated model is not a suitable framework for testing hypotheses 
related to the axioms of choice. The latter is a particular problem for the linear 
labor supply model since coherency in this case may require a forward-sloping 
labor supply curve everywhere, but the discussion easily generalizes to nonlin- 
ear labor supply functions as well. Therefore, one of the more recent topics in 
the labor supply research has been to develop estimation methods that elimi- 
nate or at least weaken the link between coherency and integrability conditions 
(see, e.g., Blundell, Duncan, and Meghir 1993). There have also been attempts 
to weaken the link between local coherency conditions and the global proper- 
ties of  the model by  using  more flexible specifications of  consumer prefer- 
ences. 
It is also important to examine to what extent the common choice of linear 
labor supply functions has affected the conclusions concerning the labor sup- 
ply responses to wages, nonlabor income, and the tax system. For example, 
Blundell, Duncan, and Meghir (1993) find evidence of backward-bending la- 
bor supply curves for part of the sample of British women using a more flexible 
model. However, for Sweden, the choice of a linear labor supply function ap- 
pears to be less restrictive. While Blomquist and Hansson-Brusewitz ( 1990) 
found evidence in favor of the quadratic labor supply function for men, their 
counterfactual policy simulations of  these specifications yield similar predic- 
tions. In a nonlinear labor supply model accounting for quantity constraints, 
Aronsson and Karlsson (1993) found no evidence of a backward-bending labor 
supply curve for men. Moreover, their study  also found that the behavioral 
differences between a linear and a nonlinear model are small. For women, we 
are, as expected, less conclusive about the restrictiveness  of commonly used 
functional forms because of the wide dispersion of the results. However, Ar- 
onsson (199 1) estimates a nonlinear labor supply function for women, account- 
ing for both taxes and quantity constraints, and found no evidence in favor of 
a backward-bending labor supply curve. 
Another line of criticism questions the assumption that the gross wage rate 
and nonlabor income are exogenous (Flood and MaCurdy  1992). Flood and 
MaCurdy (1992) present estimates for several specifications of male labor sup- 
ply functions under different estimation methods and exogeneity assumptions. 
When they fit a linear labor supply function assuming a convex budget set and 
that wages and nonlabor income are exogenous, Flood and MaCurdy (1992) 
estimate a negative income elasticity, a small positive  uncompensated  wage 
elasticity, and a small positive compensated wage elasticity (the first column 262  Thomas Aronsson and James R. Walker 
of Flood and MaCurdy estimates in table 5.2 above). They recover qualitatively 
the same labor supply elasticities when they change the estimation method 
from a maximum-likelihood estimator to an instrumental variables estimator 
while maintaining all other assumptions of the previous specifications (row 2 
of the Flood and MaCurdy estimates in table 5.2). However, when the gross 
wage and nonlabor income are considered endogenous (row 3 of the Flood and 
MaCurdy estimates in table 5.2),  their instrumental variables estimator yields 
a positive income elasticity, a large (in absolute value) negative uncompensated 
wage elasticity, and a negative compensated wage elasticity. Hence, relaxing 
the assumed exogeneity of wages and nonlabor income leads to a violation of 
the Slutsky equation (i.e., the negative compensated wage elasticity). Flood 
and MaCurdy conclude that their instrumental  variables results give strong 
support for considering richer specifications of labor supply behavior-life- 
cycle and household models of labor supply. However, in apparent neglect of 
the same evidence, the authors conclude that their instrumental variables re- 
sults treating gross wages and nonlabor income as endogenous are most likely 
to be correct. Unfortunately, Flood and MaCurdy do not elaborate or support 
this concl~sion.~~  Moreover, to generalize from their specification requires evi- 
dences that the convex budget  set procedures work well in the presence of 
nonconvex budget sets. The latter is a problem, especially when the nonco- 
nvexities appear near the observed hours of work, which may be the case for 
low-income earners according to the budget  sets described in section 5.6.1 
above. 
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